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The U.S. government has recently contended that communities cannot be “prepared” 
without first ensuring the safety of responders and their families. Organizations have 
generally done little to nothing to ensure that the families of their responders are 
adequately prepared to survive and function on their own in the absence of the responder. 
Consequently, there exists a widespread policy gap concerning family preparedness in the 
first-responder community. Research indicates that much of the U.S. population has 
ignored the U.S. government’s preparedness message and opted not to prepare. 
This thesis used a selection research method to explore whether the development 
and execution of a family preparedness program would assist the Delaware State Police 
(DSP) in maintaining its capability during a major crisis. Good ideas and precedent for 
creating such policy were captured from existing literature, leading to the conclusion that 
the DSP should mandate a comprehensive family preparedness program that includes 
emergency records management, the development of family liaison troopers, and go-kits 
for families as issued equipment. The thesis further concludes that responder family 
preparedness is different from general citizen preparedness and that leaving it in the 
“optional” category is insufficient. 
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This thesis began with the suspicion that a widespread policy gap exists in the first-
responder realm concerning the adequacy of family preparedness planning. Though the 
responder community proudly holds its families in high regard, a potential disconnect is 
created when responders are called for duty during a large-scale crisis. In such a situation, 
responders must willingly leave their families while likely feeling concerned that their 
loved ones may need them or become endangered in their absence. In essence, when 
responders are most vital to their communities, they are also much needed at home.   
This research sought out agencies that were providing, requiring, or documenting 
policy in this area. The intent was to examine and evaluate such materials in an attempt to 
recognize successes, failures, and the reasons behind these outcomes. The ultimate goal 
was to identify smart practices. Though responder family preparedness measures may be 
occurring on a very limited basis, it was found that nothing was prevalent in the literature 
or other media to indicate widespread or well-known activity. Literature did demonstrate 
that U.S. government efforts at attempting to get citizens minimally prepared, particularly 
since the eye-opening events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, have yielded lackluster 
results.   It also revealed that responders and their families have generally been lumped in 
with the rest of the citizenry, despite their unique position during these potentially 
desperate times.   
The U.S. government distinguished first responders from other citizens through 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 and for their families through the Public 
Safety Officers’ Benefits Program. These designations highlight the fact that responders 
are, indeed, in a category apart from the citizens they serve. Furthermore, the federal 
government has contended, through the Ready Responder program, that communities and 
businesses cannot be prepared without first ensuring the safety of the responders and their 
families.1 In light of this, responder family preparedness needs to be treated as a priority. 
1Federal Emergency Management Agency, Ready Responder Toolkit: Emergency Planning for First 
Responders and Their Families, Federal Emergency Management Agency Ready, accessed August 27, 
2013, www.ready.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/RRToolkit.pdf, 1. 
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The Delaware State Police (DSP), like most responder agencies, lacks planning in 
responder family preparedness. Therefore, this research focused on the primary question 
as to whether the development and execution of a comprehensive family preparedness 
program would be advisable to assist the agency in maintaining its capabilities during a 
disaster. Since nothing sufficient was discovered in existing policy, bits and pieces of 
interesting and valuable ideas found in the literature helped to shape a potential path 
toward the creation of policy for DSP. Research also assisted in developing program 
framework and evaluated factors such as cost, timeline, and ease of implementation. 
Of the interesting ideas in circulation, the go-kit was determined to be a highly 
recommended component of family preparedness. It is very hard to argue against this 
low-cost, minimal preparedness measure when the U.S. government has been telling the 
citizenry continuously for over a decade that it could be without responder assistance for 
at least three days. Another government recommendation, the Ready Responder program, 
was also deemed to hold significant value in planning and policy creation due to its 
adaptable framework. However, an important missing component in responder family 
preparedness planning is the synthesis of the various good ideas proposed. These ways of 
thinking provide a path forward, though a path is pointless unless someone is willing to 
take the first step. As such, a mandate of family preparedness with responder 
organizations taking responsibility and ownership was explored as a necessary element.  
It is recommended that DSP commit to the preparedness of its troopers and their 
families by instituting a three-part strategy to ensure that they have formulated verified 
plans, they possess the specified items that DSP has required for initial post-disaster 
survival, and that an internal support system is in place. The division should not leave 
any doubt as to whether or not troopers and their families are prepared for these most dire 
times, especially when the division is requiring that the family divide for the benefit of all 
citizens.  
This new way of thinking and acceptance of responsibility for our protectors and 
their families creates a new paradigm in the world of responder preparedness. DSP would 
be among the first-responder agencies, if not the first, to create and mandate a 
comprehensive responder family preparedness policy for the protection of its own. In 
 xii 
addition, it would also signal the start of a larger movement to take responder family 
preparedness out of the “optional” category and to have it viewed as a necessity. This will 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Over the last decade, specifically since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, public service 
agencies across the United States have made great effort to ensure that their first 
responders are adequately trained and equipped to effectively respond to large-scale and 
long-term disasters. At the same time, these very organizations have done little to nothing 
to ensure that the families of these first responders are adequately prepared to survive and 
function on their own in the absence of the responder. Not-so-subtle and recent 
reminders, such as Superstorm Sandy, caution us of this harsh reality and the fact that 
responders can be torn between loyalty to their agencies and to their families. In these 
crises, responders were called to duty while having to leave their families at home and 
potentially in harm’s way. This will inevitably occur again, and it matters how agencies 
prepare. 
The lack of planning and policy indicates a critical gap that leaves responder 
agencies far less prepared during a crisis than they may realize. Performance, morale, and 
resiliency of the responder are subject to being negatively affected when the safety of 
responder families is not taken into account. Consequently, the overall performance of 
the organization is also subject to the same negative influences. There is a troubling 
paradox: when responders are most needed by the community in which they live, they are 
simultaneously most needed by their families. Planning in this area is crucial to 
addressing this likely and predictable dilemma when tragedy strikes close to home.    
The responder culture puts families first. For example, when a responder has a 
sick spouse or child, management generally urges the responder to take the time 
necessary to assist his or her family. Conversely, when things are at their worst, such as 
during a disaster, the responder is expected to leave his or her family behind. The family 
may be without power, water, operable communication devices, and left in a state of fear 
like the rest of the surrounding population. These responder families are essentially 
absent in organizational planning. This oversight defies logic and is in direct conflict with 
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the responder culture. Therefore, research is necessary to thoroughly examine this 
dilemma and to determine if organizational responsibility for family preparedness is a 
smart practice and a viable solution. If so, the actual nature of this responsibility also 
needs to be addressed in the research. 
The Delaware Division of State Police (DSP), like most first-responder agencies, 
has not accounted for responder family preparedness and this policy gap needs to be 
bridged. To maintain agency capabilities during a significant disaster or one with long-
term consequences, perhaps DSP needs to take organizational responsibility to develop 
and ensure that mandatory preparedness measures for troopers and their families are 
continually in place. 
The primary goal of this research is to determine how to maintain the overall 
capability of DSP during a disaster; however, a secondary and much broader goal is to 
share the findings of this research with the national responder community in the hope of 
serving as a potential model for others to adopt and modify to their specific agency. This 
identified policy gap is not unique to the Delaware State Police and is a nationwide 
problem in need of further inquiry and resolution.   
B. BACKGROUND DEFINITIONS 
Four definitions are repeatedly used throughout the document and are crucial to 
understanding the discourse contained in this thesis: preparedness, smart practice, 
resilience, and first responder. The meaning of these terms is presented to provide the 
reader with the necessary context through which to follow the author’s line of thinking. It 
is not the intent of the author to debate their meaning or utility, but rather to set the stage 
for an examination of preparedness and resilience in the first-responder realm through the 
search for smart practices or their component ideas. 
“Preparedness” is not easily defined, nor measured; one person’s definition of 
being adequately prepared may vary greatly from that of another. Some citizens have 
become obsessed with preparing to live life after societal and governmental collapse, 
while others have not put an ounce of thought into what they would do if that had to 
survive a few days without electricity, food, or water. There is no one-size-fits-all 
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solution to being prepared; however, one can certainly take simple steps to make oneself 
and one’s family better prepared. For the purpose of this paper, preparedness will be 
defined as having minimal necessities to ensure that basic needs are met for at least three 
days. This yardstick echoes what the U.S. government has been recommending for a 
decade concerning the preparedness of its residents to survive for approximately 72 hours 
without government assistance during or in the wake of a disaster. Furthermore, the 
government recommends preparing a go-kit, comprised of basic necessities and tools, and 
developing a plan before disaster strikes.2  Therefore, this is the logical benchmark.   
A “smart practice” is defined as “an interesting idea embedded in some 
practice.”3  Author Eugene Bardach coined the term and explained that smart practices 
usually have something “clever” about them. He stated that this cleverness is what must 
be analyzed; he explained that the researcher must look to identify what is clever, put it 
into words, and evaluate it for its suitability to the matter at hand.4  Bardach claims that 
these practices and the driving forces behind them have the hidden potential to provide 
something of value that is free or inexpensive.5 
The notion of “resilience” is defined in the 2010 National Security Strategy as 
“the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly 
recover from disruption.”6  The term “resilience” has been increasingly used by the 
federal government as a goal of preparedness. In addition, the 2010 strategy claims that 
“national security draws on the strength and resilience of our citizens, communities, and 
economy.”7 Furthermore, the strategy calls for strengthening our preparedness and 
resilience and explains that, no matter the measures, every threat will not be thwarted; 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Build a Kit: Basic Disaster Supply Kit,” Federal 
Emergency Management Agency Ready, accessed October 17, 2013, http://www.ready.gov/basic-disaster-
supplies-kit. 
3 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving (New York: Chatham House, 2000), 72. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
6 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), White House, 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, 18. 
7 Ibid., 10. 
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this is the reason why we must increase our resilience. It advises that the federal 
government will continue to engage the public and will provide useful steps that all 
Americans can take to protect themselves and their families.8 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) identifies “first 
responders” as “those individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible 
for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, 
including emergency response providers…”9 It also includes “emergency management, 
public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as 
equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during prevention, 
response, and recovery operations.”10   
C. DSP BACKGROUND  
As part of their extensive and ongoing training, Delaware troopers receive state-
of-the-art instruction and the most modern weapons and equipment. This assists in 
increasing their confidence and their ability to successfully perform in their roles. 
Troopers are required by policy to be both physically and mentally prepared to carry out 
their duties. Their physical abilities are certified through annual weigh-ins and fitness 
tests, as well as semi-annual firearms qualifications. DSP has done an exceptional job of 
preparing troopers to be tactically sound and resilient in their work roles. However, the 
mental preparedness of troopers is not so easy to gauge and is generally assumed 
adequate, absent other evidence. 
As dedicated as these troopers are to their jobs, many are equally, if not more, 
dedicated to their families as spouses, partners, fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, and 
caregivers. They manage to strike a balance between their work lives and their family 
lives, often with much interference in the form of overlap stemming from erratic 
schedules, call-outs, work and work-related stress that they take home. This juggling of 
8 Ibid., 17–19. 
9 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 (Washington, DC: White House, 
2003), Federation of American Scientists, https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html. 
10 Ibid. 
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priorities occurs regularly during their everyday lives. The real problems emerge when 
troopers are faced with the low-frequency, high-risk events that truly test their mettle. A 
large-scale natural disaster, industrial accident, or terror attack all fall into this category. 
To date, troopers have responded to significant weather-related events, such as 
snowstorms, nor’easters, and hurricanes; however, most have not been separated from 
their families for any significant, unexpected period of time. Nevertheless, all troopers 
know that this requirement to respond is part of the organizational rules and a true 
possibility. It is part of the culture and is understood. The DSP motto of “service before 
self” represents far more than just words. 
A popular unofficial motto among Delaware troopers is “family first.”  Typically, 
sick or injured family members who are in need of the care of the trooper are given first 
priority during these times, and management often advises the trooper that his/her family 
comes before the job. This deviation from the official motto of “service before self” and 
the justification that goes along with that deviation clearly demonstrate that the “self” 
includes one’s family unit, who ultimately also makes a daily sacrifice. It is 
commonplace at award ceremonies to hear recipients thank their families for the 
sacrifices that they, too, have made to support the trooper throughout his/her career. The 
family members of first responders do pay a price. Due to an around-the-clock schedule, 
ball games to birthdays are often missed because of work responsibilities taking a higher 
priority due to the chosen profession, which many troopers feel is a “calling.”  This 
balancing act often carries with it a sense of guilt and anxiety regarding one’s loved ones. 
The Delaware State Police currently lacks any set policies and/or procedures to 
ensure that troopers and their families are adequately equipped physically or mentally to 
sustain them during or in the immediate wake of a disaster. This issue should be of the 
utmost importance since troopers could be called and ordered to leave their families. 
Recent research, outlined below, points to the fact that first responders take into 
consideration family concerns when deciding whether or not to respond to a large-scale 
crisis, especially when their families are left in potential danger. Furthermore, these 
concerns also weigh heavily on their minds during a crisis and can negatively affect their 
work performance and safety. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The primary research question is: Would the development and execution of a 
comprehensive family preparedness program assist the Delaware State Police (DSP) in 
maintaining its capability during a time of a major crisis?   
The secondary and related research questions are: 
• What policies and/or practices exist, are in development, or are being 
discussed to support family preparedness within the first-responder 
community?  
• Are any of the identified policies, practices, or ideas useful to DSP?  
• How could a family preparedness program be developed and 
implemented?  
• What are the associated policy issues? 
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II. METHOD AND OVERVIEW OF THESIS  
During this thesis preparation, research was conducted in an attempt to answer the 
primary question as to whether the development and execution of a family preparedness 
program would assist the Delaware State Police in maintaining its capability during a 
major crisis. Several related sub-questions were addressed, the first being how family 
preparedness is being approached throughout the national first-responder community.  
This exploration was accomplished by determining what policies and/or 
procedures exist, are in development, or are being discussed. In addition, the research 
attempted to determine if any agencies are mandating family preparedness measures and 
if a similar such mandate could be key to improving DSP family preparedness. Research 
was conducted mainly through a review of existing and emerging literature, primarily in 
the field of government, law enforcement, and emergency services. These primary and 
secondary sources included theses, dissertations, government documents, websites, 
pamphlets, journals, newspaper articles, and other periodicals.  
The results of this investigation, contained in Chapter III, reveal what similar 
policies, procedures, practices, and interesting ideas exist or existed among the first-
responder communities in our nation. This undertaking was approached as a selection 
research project using a prescriptive and normative approach to sorting the data. This 
method assisted in identifying the interesting ideas and “smart practices” that have risen 
to the surface in the scholarship and discourse in the realm of first responders.  
The second step in this research involved sifting through existing programs and 
the interesting ideas that were uncovered. Each was examined and evaluated in an 
attempt to recognize successes, failures, and the reasons behind these outcomes. The 
anticipated reward for this effort is the discovery of smart practices and their applicability 
to DSP. This exploratory and inductive research was imperative in preparing to develop 
new policy where none currently exists—a critical policy gap within DSP. This analysis 
is contained in Chapter IV. 
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The path of some inquiries widened the scope related to the thesis topic and 
revealed issues important in their shared concepts. These apparent similarities to the 
thesis topic were analyzed for parallel lines of thinking, correlation, and explanations. 
They were also examined for their applicability related to the concepts of responder 
family preparedness, mandated behavior, and organizational responsibility. This analysis 
is contained in Chapter V. 
Research moved toward solving the problem through the development of policy 
specific to DSP as outlined in Chapter VI. In turn, the appropriate interesting ideas and 
relevant issues that were analyzed were synthesized with DSP’s needs in mind. This 
undertaking aimed to build a framework for minimal responder family preparedness by 
providing equipment, planning, and personnel to achieve a higher level of said 
preparedness. Such factors as cost, timeframes, and ease of implementation were 
addressed.  
Chapter VII discusses obstacles and possible resolutions related to the execution 
of this plan. Such matters as funding and the preferential treatment of responders are 
debated. The concept of changing mindsets is also addressed, discussing the impact of the 
program, risks and payoffs, and the power of collaboration. Chapter VIII concludes this 






III. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review reveals a lack of information on the topic of mandatory 
preparedness for first responders. It also reveals that there is even less information 
pertaining to the related concept of responder organizations being responsible or sharing 
the burden for the preparedness of their personnel and their personnel’s families. 
However, it appears that interest is moving in this direction due to the realization that 
emergency response plans are inherently flawed in their current assumption that 
responders will, without doubt, be present, both mentally and physically, to execute those 
plans. Until recently, this very important ingredient, that of a ready and willing 
responder, appears to have been taken for granted in first-responder planning. In the 
literature, a debate emerged and continues to this day.    
The tragedies of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina renewed concerns about responders 
responding. Since then, some solutions have been proposed, and the pendulum is 
swinging in the direction of the government making efforts to get citizens and responder 
organizations adequately prepared. Though this effort has been thought provoking for 
many citizens, government engagement in promoting preparedness has only been 
suggested, recommended, and, therefore, remains optional. In reality, this endeavor has 
not translated into any widespread and successful preparedness efforts. 
B. EARLY THOUGHT 
In 1952, Lewis M. Killian published an article in the American Journal of 
Sociology examining the significance of multiple-group membership in disasters.11 He 
noted that issues encountered in disasters “brought to light latent contradictions in roles 
not ordinarily regarded as conflicting.”12 He provided the example of one individual with 
three separate roles—businessman, family man, and volunteer firefighter—who normally 
11 Lewis M. Killian, “The Significance of Multiple-Group Membership in Disaster,” The American 
Journal of Sociology LVI, no. 4 (January 1952). Thanks to Mark Landahl for this source. 
12 Ibid., 310. 
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acted separately in those roles. Killian surmised that, during a disaster, individuals could 
be placed in a quandary when having to make an immediate choice between the now-
conflicting roles. From the four incidents that he examined, Killian labeled the choice 
between the family and another group, such as the employer or the community, as the 
most frequent dilemma.13   
Ultimately, Killian concluded that individuals may find that it is “impossible to 
serve two masters” by acting simultaneously in both roles and that further research was 
needed in this area to predict which choices individuals will make.14 He also predicted 
that loyalty to primary groups is generally superior. However, he noted that there are 
exceptions and that “training and feelings of responsibility, may predispose the individual 
to adhere to secondary-group demands even in a disaster.”15  
C. DISASTER DISCOURSE 
Some scholars have carried forward and pursued Killian’s hypothesis; however, 
not everyone agreed with his thoughts on conflicting roles representing a potential pitfall 
for responder agencies. In 1984, Enrico Quarantelli, founder of the Disaster Research 
Center (DRC) at the Ohio State University that later relocated to the University of 
Delaware, claimed that the research had demonstrated that “this so-called role conflict 
does not result in the abandonment of, or failure to carry out, occupational 
responsibilities.”16  Quarantelli conceded that there is psychological strain, but that 
emergency personnel can be expected to carry out their duties.17  He cautioned that 
“disaster planning must rest on valid knowledge and not myths or misconceptions.”18 
13 Ibid., 311. 
14 Ibid., 314. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Erico L. Quarantelli, Organizational Behavior in Disasters and Implications for Disaster Planning 
(Emmitsburg, MD: National Training Center, 1984), University of Delaware, 
http://udspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/1265/RS18.pdf;jsessionid=910DC985C35E030F91CD54F
FA30FC87B?sequence=1, 17. 
17 Ibid., 17. 
18 Ibid., 29. 
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Two years later, in 1986, a fellow DRC researcher, Russell Dynes, explained that 
Killian’s work was read by many and interpreted as an “explanatory concept.”19  He 
advised that many researchers believed that in a disaster responders would choose their 
families first.20  According to Dynes, these researchers started adding anecdotes to 
Killian’s concept, giving it “a sense of reality.”21  In addition, Dynes stated that Killian 
did not find responders choosing their families over their duties and had only advised that 
it could happen.22  According to Dynes, since 1963, DRC has interviewed over 7,000 
organizational officials regarding 150 different disasters, and they concluded that role 
conflict was not problematic.23 Conversely, he stated that too much manpower during 
these times was the real problem.24   
Both Dynes and Quarantelli claimed that role strain is reduced in disasters; they 
explain that structural changes provide for conditions leading to the “positive 
reinforcement of relevant emergency roles.”25  Dynes further explained that police and 
fire agencies are paramilitary groups with rigidly defined role expectations and call-out 
procedures.26  He stated that these responders have both personal and organizational 
motivations to carry out their duties. Dynes claimed, “Role abandonment is non-existent. 
Role strain is minimal and role conflict is irrelevant.”27  However, Dynes footnoted that 
several variables might be important in further analyzing the concept of role conflict. He 
explained that the “nature of the disaster”28 could be an important factor and that slower 
onset and widespread disasters may, perhaps, result in role conflict. Moreover, Dynes 
19 Russell R. Dynes, “The Concept of Role in Disaster Research” (preliminary paper 105, Disaster 
Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark, NJ, 1986), http://udspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle 
/19716/2516/PP%20105%20DSpace%20Ready.pdf?sequence, 19.  
20 Ibid., 10. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 12. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 16. 
26 Ibid., 24. 
27 Ibid., 25. 
28 Ibid., 33. 
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also noted that an absence of organizational planning in this area may, indeed, create 
higher levels of role conflict.29  Despite the lack of empirical evidence, it appears that 
Dynes agrees with Killian’s position that it could someday happen. 
Quarantelli, Dynes, and other scholars at the DRC have been instrumental in 
changing the mindset concerning the very concept of “disaster” and the fact that disasters 
are not just large-scale accidents.30 In the context of his 1984 article, Quarantelli painted 
an evolving threat picture. He explained that a new group of potential man-made threats, 
such as “technological accidents and mishaps” involving “chemical, nuclear, and 
electrical power” systems, had joined the list of natural disasters such as hurricanes and 
tornadoes.31 Quarantelli even forecasted that computer network problems could possibly 
lead to issues in the financial sector.32  He explained that new and evolving technology 
would add to the complexity of these future threats.33  Quarantelli also claimed the future 
would have more disasters and that the effects of these disasters would lead to higher 
levels of “social disruption and economic or property losses.”34 He noted that aging 
infrastructure in older American cities could also contribute to possible future disaster; 
decaying bridges, tunnels, highways and aging water and sewer systems, possibly could 
create and/or exacerbate a future disaster.35 
Twenty-two years later, in 2006, Quarantelli was still conducting research and 
publishing at DRC. He, no doubt, was influenced by the enormity of the damage and 
social disruption caused by Hurricane Katrina. For example, he stated that during 
Katrina, there was “a great deal of work-family role conflict in key emergency 
29 Ibid., 33. 
30 Erico L. Quarantelli, “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for 
CrisisPlanning and Managing Drawn from Katrina,” June 2006, Social Science Research Council, 
http://www.iworkweb.com/DART_training_2011/pdf/week_1/Quarantelli_2006.pdf, 1. 
31Quarantelli, Organizational Behavior, 1. 
32 Ibid., 2. 
33 Ibid., 1. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 2. 
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organizations.”36 In addition, he noted that anecdotal evidence suggested that one third of 
New Orleans Police Department officers failed to report for duty and/or failed to remain 
on the job. This non-reporting was something that he previously viewed as not being an 
issue, and he continued to voice his skepticism, pointing out that the city’s fire 
department did not experience the same problem.37  It is important to note that two years 
later, Quarantelli concluded that the police department was “highly dysfunctional long 
before Katrina” and not capable of professionally serving the city.38  
After reviewing Katrina and looking back at other non-typical disasters such as 
Hurricane Hugo that obliterated St. Croix in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew that leveled 
Homestead, Florida in 1992, Quarantelli saw the necessity for re-categorizing disasters. 
He identified such incidents as the 1900 Hurricane that devastated Galveston, Texas and 
the earthquake and resulting fires that ravaged San Francisco in 1906 as other such 
atypical disasters.39 Quarantelli stated that such incidents were “qualitatively” larger than 
simply a “disaster.”40  He suggested that such crises be given the upgraded conceptual 
title of “catastrophe.”41 Quarantelli advised that he and a few others had been pushing for 
this separate distinction for a few decades and that the more recent incidents such as 
Katrina caused this concept to be taken more to heart.42  In retrospect, Katrina may have 
also served as a prime opportunity to validate past disaster research findings and to 
update disaster research science in the newer and more dangerous world. Perhaps, the 
issue that Killian had hypothesized now took on deeper relevance. 
36 Quarantelli, “Catastrophes,” 4. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Erico L. Quarantelli, “Conventional Beliefs and Counterintuitive Realities,” Social Research: An 
International Quarterly of the Social Sciences 75, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 891, University of Delaware, accessed 
October 7, 2013, http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/4242. 
39 Quarantelli, “Catastrophes,” 2. 
40 Ibid., 1. 
41 Ibid., 2. 
42 Ibid., 4. 
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Quarantelli, once again, addressed and continued to update the evolving threat 
picture. This time, he added terrorism to the category of man-made threat.43 
Significantly, no longer were these threats solely the result of accident or mishap. 
Quarantelli did not classify the events of 9/11 as anything more than a disaster, but noted 
that a nuclear or biological terror attack could possibly rise to the level of 
“catastrophe.”44  He advised that planning and management for a catastrophe was not 
much different from that of a disaster. He encouraged near-everyday training and 
“planning from the ground up rather than from the top down,” emphasizing that this held 
higher value for response to a catastrophe.45  In the end, Quarantelli stated this was not 
the last word, and he encouraged readers of his work to “think outside of their usual 
perceptual boxes.”46 It is encouraging to find a central founder of the disaster research 
field not speaking in absolutes and inviting new and unconventional thinking in this area.   
D. RESURGENCE IN LITERATURE 
New thinking did emerge. A resurgence in interest can be attributed to a list of 
failures that were revealed during the extreme conditions present on the Gulf Coast 
during Hurricane Katrina. Most obviously was the fact that the New Orleans Police 
Department was rendered almost ineffective during the storm due to officers not 
responding for duty or leaving their posts.47 Role abandonment played a part for many of 
the estimated 240 of the 1,450 New Orleans police officers who never showed up for 
work during the event.48 Consequently, over 200 officers were administratively 
43 Ibid., 7 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 6. 
46 Ibid., 7. 
47 Mark Landahl and Cynthia Cox, “Beyond the Plan: Individual Responder and Family Preparedness 
in the Resilient Organization,” Homeland Security Affairs V, no. 3 (September 2009): 2, 
www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=5.3.4. 
48 Joseph E. Trainor and Lauren E. Barsky, “Reporting for Duty? A Synthesis of Research on Role 
Conflict, Strain and Abandonment among Emergency Responders during Disasters and Catastrophes” 
(Newark, DE: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 2011), 
http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/handle/19716/9885, 13. 
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investigated for their absences and many resigned or were fired.49  This breakdown 
fueled speculation as to whether or not other first responders would respond to similar 
catastrophic events in the future. 
Similarly, the National Fire Academy has produced some relevant research on the 
topic of role conflict. In 2005, Robert Hudson noted that since 9/11 smaller fire 
departments realized that they were living in a new era and that they, too, were subject to 
long-term deployments previously only conducted by FEMA, urban search and rescue 
teams (USAR), or larger fire departments involved in combatting wildfires. In the wake 
of the collapse of the Twin Towers, Hudson and his fire department from distant 
Michigan responded to New York City to assist FDNY.50  This was groundbreaking for 
his department and served as an awakening.51  Hudson’s research led him to the 
conclusion that the fire service in general had policy covering a broad range of topics; 
however, they lacked any requirements that mandated minimal preparedness for agencies 
or for developing a family support organization.52 Hudson conducted a survey of 86 
emergency responders from agencies located throughout the U.S.53 and determined that 
91 percent of his respondents indicated that their departments lacked plans for family 
preparedness54 and that 81 percent believed that their departments should do more.55  
According to Hudson, these survey results should serve as a “red flag to agency 
administrators.”56 
The concepts of “ability” and “willingness” of responders to report for duty were 
first used together in a 2005 large-scale public health study conducted by Kristine 
Quereshi, R. Gerson, and M. Sherman in which they examined whether healthcare 
49 Kevin Johnson, “Katrina Made Police Choose between Duty and Loved Ones,” USA Today, 
February 20, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20-neworleanspolice_x.htm.  
50 Robert M. Hudson, Emergency Preparedness for Responders and Their Families: Are We Ready? 
(Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 2005), 5. 
51 Ibid., 7–8. 
52 Ibid., 43. 
53 Ibid., 38. 
54 Ibid., 51. 
55 Ibid., 53. 
56 Ibid. 
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workers would respond to a disaster.57 These concepts combined have become a widely 
accepted category in response analysis. A fair amount of research on these issues has 
been conducted at the Center for Defense and Homeland Security (CHDS) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School with several graduate-level papers being written specifically on the 
topic of responders answering their call to duty and agency responsibility. These studies 
span several disciplines, but had similar conclusions. In 2007 Shelly Schechter studied 
the Medical Reserve Corps in Nassau County, New York. She determined that 
responsibility to family was one of the most significant obstacles to the fulfillment of job 
requirements.58 The same year, Nancy Demme examined the police response to a 
potential biological incident in the National Capital Region (NCR) and found that family 
preparedness would be a determining factor in regard to both the ability and willingness 
of police officers to report for the incident.59 In 2008, John Delaney studied the ability 
and willingness of firefighters responding to a theoretical pandemic flu outbreak in NCR 
and had similar findings as Demme.60 In the same regard, Brian Sturdivant, in 2009, 
argued “that ‘equipping first-responders’ also entails the safety and well-being of their 
immediate family members.”61 In all of these studies, the family was a very important 
consideration for responders.  
Other researchers, such as Jane Kushma of the Institute of Preparedness at  
Jacksonville State University noted that planning in advance for family preparedness had 
effectively minimized role conflict for responders over the years. However, she advised 
that there is increased interest in the potential for catastrophic disaster, coupled with the 
new threat of terrorism and biological or radiological attack. Kushma highlighted the 
57 Kristine Quereshi, R. Gershon, and M. Sherman, “Health Care Workers’ Willingness and Ability to 
Report to Duty during Catastrophic Disasters,” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York 
Academy of Medicine 82, no.3 (2005): 379. 
58 Shelley Schecter, “Medical Reserve Corps Volunteers’ Ability and Willingness to Report to Work 
for the Department of Health During Catastrophic Disasters” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2007).  
59 Nancy Demme, “Government Expectations and the Role of Law Enforcement in a Biological 
Incident” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
60 John Delaney, “Firefighters’ Ability and Willingness to Participate in a Pandemic” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
61 Brian E. Sturdivant, “Support Framework for First Responder Family Members: A Proposed Model 
for Increasing Responder Effectiveness” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 4. 
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above Quereshi et al. study and the fact that many health care workers stated that they 
would not respond to work during such an event. Kushma claimed that role conflict and 
role abandonment have not been given “serious attention” for 30 years.62  She questioned 
how things over the years have changed, to include labor force issues and a different 
generation of workers and workplaces, and how these factors may influence responder 
attitude. In the end, Kushma called for a detailed review of role conflict, strain, and 
abandonment. She encouraged planning founded on empirical research and cautioned 
planners to avoid relying on myth63, echoing DRC researchers.  
Mark Landahl and Cynthia Cox, both CHDS alumni, published a very 
comprehensive piece in 2009 and cited many of the abovementioned works in their 
Homeland Security Affairs journal article entitled Beyond the Plan: Individual Responder 
and Family Preparedness in the Resilient Organization. The authors advised that “the 
issue of responder and family preparedness is ‘just below the radar’ in our national 
preparedness efforts” and that this issue has not been directly researched.64  They further 
noted that such response “rests upon the assumption that the human element, essential 
employees, will be ready and able to carry out the functions that have been planned.”65 
The authors further stated that this “assumption” that a first responder will report for duty 
is “the foundation of the ability of organizations to maintain continuity and provide 
essential services to citizens affected by disaster.”66  They, therefore, questioned the 
strength of this foundation and reported that personal and family preparedness and safety 
were the primary issues for first responders in both their ability and willingness to answer 
the call for duty in a crisis. The authors asked if employers were doing enough to 
62 Jane Kushma, “Role Abandonment in Disaster: Should We Leave This Myth Behind?” Natural 
Hazards Observer XXXI no. 5 (May 2007), accessed October 5, 2013, 
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/o/archives/2007/may07/myths.html.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Landahl and Cox, “Beyond the Plan,” 19. 
65 Ibid, 1. 
66 Ibid.  
 17 
                                                 
alleviate these concerns so that responders will answer the call during these difficult 
times.67   
Landahl and Cox concluded that personal and family preparedness issues were at 
the “forefront of the minds of responders in their decision to report to work in 
emergencies.”68  They questioned whether the same concern was at the forefront of the 
organization or whether the organization was focused too much on the actual mission that 
was to be accomplished by the responder if they did, indeed, report for duty. In short, 
responder attendance was presumed to be a constant, when in actuality it was the most 
important variable. 
To further their point, Landahl and Cox examined the 37 core capabilities used by 
the U.S. government to measure National Preparedness. These capabilities were 
identified as the means “to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from all-hazard 
emergencies.”69  They concluded that none of the capabilities dealt directly with 
preparedness for the responders or their families or proposed how to minimize family 
concerns related to the willingness of responders to respond.70   They also conducted a 
survey of current students and graduates in the CHDS Master’s degree and Executive 
Leaders’ programs to gather information pertaining to preparedness for employees and 
the role of the organization in preparedness and resilience. They found that 46.8 percent 
of organizations had written plans or policies to support employees with food and shelter 
during large-scale disasters. Only 29.2 percent had written plans or policies to support 
employee families with the same. Of those surveyed, 97 percent agreed that employee 
and family preparedness was an essential element in organizational resilience during 
large-scale emergencies.71  Over half, 52.9 percent, stated that the organization should be 
prepared to take responsibility for the care of critical employees and their families.72  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 3. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 5. 
71 Ibid., 8. 
72 Ibid., 9.  
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Landahl and Cox questioned why, if it was reportedly so important to an organization, 
did they only encourage employee and family preparedness and not require it.73   They 
make a very powerful and logical point. 
Landahl subsequently collaborated in 2011 with Chris Bertram and Michael 
Williams to publish an article in Sheriff Magazine entitled, “Family vs. Duty: Personal 
and Family Preparedness for Law Enforcement Organizational Resilience.”74  The article 
stresses that law enforcement agencies should implement policies to increase both 
personal and family preparedness. They advise that these policies must include steps, 
goals, training, and communication surrounding the family support that will be provided 
during disasters. They write that “provisions for the safety of the officers’ families should 
be a component of a plan. Planning and policy development can steer the organizational 
culture to a culture of preparedness that include (sic) the families of our most critical 
asset; our people.”75 
In 2011, Joseph Trainor and Lauren Barsky of the University of Delaware 
Disaster Research Center (DRC) conducted a study to explore the very question of 
whether first responders would answer the call or shirk their responsibilities during such 
trying times. They, too, used the ability and willingness approach to examine this subject 
and their study also discussed the three main issues of role strain, role conflict, and role 
abandonment. The authors advised that, from a behavioral research perspective, using 
real life disasters, role strain and role conflict seldom lead to role abandonment.76  They 
concluded that first responders would answer the call to duty and that fears of them 
abandoning their responsibilities were exaggerated.77    
Trainor and Barsky stated that they would not go as far as to say that role 
abandonment will never occur and acknowledged that a crisis larger than what they had 
73 Ibid., 10. 
74 Chris Bertram, Mark Landahl, and Michael C. Williams, “Family vs. Duty: Personal and Family 
Preparedness for Law Enforcement Organizational Resilience,” Sheriff Magazine, January–February 2011. 
75 Ibid., 36. 
76 Trainor and Barsky, “Reporting for Duty?,”13. 
77 Andrea Boyle, “They Will Respond,” UDaily, August 18, 2011, University of Delaware, 
http://www.udel.edu/udaily/2012/aug/disaster-first-responders-081811.html. 
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studied may produce a different result.78  In the case of the New Orleans Police 
Department during Katrina, they noted that role abandonment by the police was a 
“notable exception” to the trend and that it was significant in that sense.79 The authors 
advised that many have blamed this abandonment on pre-existing issues within the police 
department; however, they cautioned that there have been “no detailed scientific 
analyses” examining that occurrence.80   
Employers play a significant role in reducing stress for first responders and their 
families according to Trainor and Barsky. They also claimed that both role strain and 
conflict are “common” and that efforts should be undertaken by employers to minimize 
these factors.81 The authors concluded that the “focus on role abandonment is likely 
misplaced” and suggested shifting that focus from the workers to the organization.82  
They claimed that organizational design and structure could serve to “increase or 
decrease these tensions.”83  Trainor recommends that employers conduct outreach to start 
families thinking about preparedness issues. He also recommends that employers do more 
by organizing support and appropriate resources for these families.84  
E. PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS 
In 2011, Christopher Kelenske conducted research at CHDS to identify reasons 
why first responders do not personally prepare for disasters.85  He found that responders 
do not prepare because either they do not think about it, it is too expensive, or they do not 
believe that it will affect them.86 Kelenske advocates responder agencies taking the 
responsibility of ensuring that their responders and responder families are informed, 
78 Trainor and Barsky, “Reporting for Duty?,” 26. 
79 Ibid., 13. 
80 Ibid., 14. 
81 Ibid., 26. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Boyle, “They Will Respond.” 
85 Christopher Kelenske, “Emergency Responder Personal Preparedness” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011). 
86 Ibid., 72. 
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trained, and adequately equipped. He believes that first responders are in a category 
separate from average citizens and that federal homeland security funding should be 
made available through grants.87 
Around the same time, the government did take a larger role in attempting to have 
first responders heed the preparedness message. In 2011 Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched 
the Ready Responder initiative, which was born out of the mindset that first responders 
and their families must be prepared.88  This campaign is geared toward responder 
organizations and provides them with the framework to develop policies and buy-in 
within their agencies. The program also provides incentives in the form of possible 
available grant money to implement and evaluate their level of preparedness. Said 
evaluation comes in the form of self-reporting from the responders in either a survey or a 
signed affidavit. This is one step closer to mandating preparedness, but it falls short by 
relying on unverified self-reporting.89 
The above research demonstrates that employers can have a profound impact on 
improving the psychological well-being of their employees by taking the effort to ensure 
that first responders and their families are adequately prepared to live through a disaster. 
The U.S. military has long been dealing with their troops being separated from their 
families for extended periods of time and has worked to build resilience among its 
personnel.90  Adrienne Stith Butler, Alison Panzer, and Lewis Goldfrank draw a 
comparison between first responders in a disaster and deployed military personnel in the 
sense that both may be separated from their families and mutually concerned about the 
87 Ibid., 77. 
88 “Welch Launches National FEMA Campaign,” news release, July 2010, Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security, accessed November 10, 2012, http://www.chds.us/?press/release&id=2452. 
89 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Ready Responder Toolkit: Emergency Planning for First 
Responders and Their Families, Federal Emergency Management Agency Ready, accessed August 27, 
2013, www.ready.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/RRToolkit.pdf, 46. 
90 Michael T. Kindt, Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned Lessons from 
Military and Civilian Experience (Maxwell AFB: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2006), 
cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/buildingpopres.pdf, 11. 
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well-being of their loved ones.91  The authors suggest that responder agencies look to the 
military for models on supporting families. The authors further advise that the military 
provides support groups, daycare, medical services, and other types of family support.92  
According to U.S. Air Force (USAF) Lieutenant Colonel Michael T. Kindt, the 
military provides such services so that service members are assured that their families are 
prepared during their deployment and so that the service members can concentrate on 
their deployment and the related crisis.93  Kindt is a strong proponent of the U.S. 
government adopting military approaches to building resilience “through focused 
preparation efforts” among citizens.94  He claims that the U.S. failure to adopt such 
approaches represents a “missed opportunity in our national preparedness efforts.”95 
Traditionally, the U.S. military has focused on the well-being of deployed 
soldiers; however, new and expanding research has been evaluating the psychological 
welfare of their families.96  Findings indicate “the need to pay increased attention” to 
families of combat deployed soldiers.97  Military One Source is a program funded by the 
U.S. Department of Defense. It serves active, national guard, and reserve components of 
the military, as well as their families. Program services cover both online and telephone 
support, in-person counseling, and a wide array of resources relating to the stresses that 
go along with military life.98  Other web-based options for support include sites such as 
91 Adrienne Stith Butler, Allison M. Panzer, Lewis R Goldfrank, Preparing for the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2003), 
113. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Kindt, Building Population, 13. 
94 Ibid., 15. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Abigail H. Gerwirtz, Christopher R. Erbes, Melissa A. Polusny, Marion S. Forgatch, and David S. 
DeGarmo, “Helping Military Families through the Deployment Process: Strategies to Support Parenting,” 
Professional Psychology Research and Practice 42, no. 1 (2011): 56–62, doi:10.1037/a0022345.  
97 Ibid., 9. 
98 “About Military OneSource,” Military One Source, accessed October 8, 2013, 
http://www.militaryonesource.mil/footer?content_id=267441. 
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Ready Army, Ready Navy and Air Force Be Ready that provide military families with 
information on general disaster preparedness.99  
F. CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 
All literature on this topic logically starts with preparedness in general. This 
concept has existed for some time in the emergency management realm, though the 
notion of individual preparedness began shortly after the attacks of 9/11. FEMA’s 
marketing campaign began to emerge and evolve after Hurricane Katrina. Over the last 
decade, the federal government has been informing the members of the general public 
that they could be on their own, without food, water, power, and communications for at 
least three days after a catastrophic event.100  They have been relaying the message that 
the average citizen needs to be prepared and that this is an individual responsibility; 
however, this message has gone mostly unheard.101   
The RAND Corporation questions why Americans are not listening to the 
preparedness messages and claims that the U.S. needs to “rethink how we promote and 
measure preparedness.”102  It claims that the current focus on individual preparedness has 
led to public indifference.103  RAND researchers call for a paradigm shift and have 
identified two steps that they claim can support this new direction: cultivating a sense of 
shared responsibility and making efficient and effective use of existing resources to 
support preparedness.104  
99 For examples, see: Ready Army website, www.acsim.army.mil/readyarmy; Air Force Be Ready 
website, www.beready.af.mil; and Ready Navy website, www.ready.navy.mil.  
100 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Build a Kit.”  
101 Lori Uscher-Pines, Anita Chandra, Jose Acosta, and Arthur L. Kellerman, “Why Aren’t Americans 




104 Jeanne S. Ringel and Jeffrey Wasserman, “The Public Health System a Decade After 9/11: Key 
Successes and Continuing Challenges,” in The Long Shadow of 9/11: America’s Response to Terrorism, ed. 
Brian Michael Jenkins and John Paul Godges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2011), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9608/index1.html, 182. 
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Two more studies at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) 
examined this need for a cultural shift and how it could be accomplished. In 2008, 
Annemarie Conroy reported that citizens were very unprepared for disasters and that the 
government needed to do more to create a culture of preparedness.105  She identified 
seatbelt use and breast cancer awareness campaigns as models of success and pointed to 
problems with measuring actual preparedness.106  In 2010, Nicholas Campasano reported 
that the U.S. population is generally unprepared.107  He challenged the personal behavior 
models used by the Citizen Corps to market preparedness efforts and recommended the 
simultaneous implementation of societal and community motivations as opposed to solely 
individual motivation.108 
Government documents, websites, and informational campaigns examined in this 
review reveal that the government has taken a passive approach to getting citizens 
prepared to be their own first responders during the critical initial phase of a disaster and 
that this approach has not worked well. The primary government effort in getting U.S. 
citizens prepared has been the Citizens Corps initiative. FEMA has consistently reported 
that the Citizen Corps program is a success; however, not everyone agrees with this 
assessment.   
In 2006, Kindt deemed the Citizen Corps a failure in terms of developing a 
resilient America.109  He accused Citizen Corps of dramatically misrepresenting its 
success by utilizing misleading metrics.110 To illustrate his point, Kindt noted that the 
Citizen Corps webpage reported that its programs were very successful throughout the 
U.S., and that 2,117 Citizen Corps councils were serving 73 percent of the U.S. 
population. Kindt claimed that this was simply not true; he demonstrated that fewer than 
105 Annemarie Conroy, “What Is Going to Move The Needle on Citizen Preparedness? Can America 
Create a Culture of Preparedness?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 6. 
106 Ibid., 6. 
107 Nicholas Campasano, “Community Preparedness: Creating a Model for Change” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), v. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Kindt, Building Population, 23. 
110 Ibid.. 
 24 
                                                 
11 percent of 19,429 municipal governments in the U.S. had established Citizen Corps 
councils. Furthermore, Kindt noted that an approximate total of 165,000 citizens had 
received training from Citizen Corps, which equated to only .05 percent of the entire U.S. 
population. Lastly, he cited a 2003 survey, sponsored by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, that indicated most people in the country had never heard of Citizen 
Corps and, of the eight percent who had, many could not give an accurate description of 
what Citizen Corps did.111 
The only deviation from this relatively bland and consistently passive government 
effort involved an innovative approach taken by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
in 2011 that spoofed the preparedness campaign and provided information on how to 
prepare for a zombie apocalypse.112  After a worldwide rash of bizarre flesh-eating 
crimes—five in one week in 2012, CDC opted to contact the media and convey that the 
agency “does not know of a virus or condition that would reanimate the dead (or one that 
would present zombie-like symptoms)” and that this was only a comedic approach to 
their preparedness campaign.113  The CDC did not abandon this appeal and has reported 
that the effort has been successful in getting its message to a wider and more diverse 
audience on the Internet.114 
At the close of 2011, FEMA reached out to the members of the public and asked 
them to resolve to be ready for the coming year. It advised that there were more billion-
dollar natural disasters in 2011 than any previous year on record, ranging from Hurricane 
Irene to the devastating tornadoes that struck Alabama and Missouri.115  In 2012, FEMA 
changed the wording of its approach by now “urging” individuals and businesses to take 
111 Ibid., 22. 
112 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Preparedness 101: Zombie Apocalypse,” Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, accessed November 1, 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/zombies.htm. 
113 “Zombie Apocalypse: CDC Denies Existence of Zombies Despite Cannibal Incidents,” Huffington 
Post, June 1, 2012, accessed November 2, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/01/cdc-denies-
zombies-existence_n_1562141.html.  
114 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Preparedness 101: Zombie Apocalypse.” 
115 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Resolve to be Ready in 2012—Toolkit,” Federal 
Emergency Management Agency Ready, accessed August 21, 2012, 
www.ready.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/2012_R2BR.pdf, 2. 
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action to prepare themselves in advance of severe weather and hurricanes. Via its 
website, it offered individuals the opportunity to make a written pledge and become 
“Coalition Members.” As such, members would “have access to exclusive resources and 
be able to collaborate with thousands of fellow members across the country.”116  It 
appears counter-productive to make citizens jump through extra hoops to get to this 
valuable information that the government has been struggling to convey for over a 
decade. In short, most of these programs, such as Ready.gov and DHS.gov are simply an 
offering from the government to those who may be interested. Moving from a suggestion, 
to a recommendation, then to an urging is still simply not enough to motivate the majority 
of Americans, let alone first-responder organizations. These passive approaches to 
preparedness will not lead to a prepared nation.  
In February of 2013, FEMA and the American Red Cross jointly published 
Summary Report on Awareness to Action: A Workshop on Motivating the Public to 
Prepare.117  This document related to a two-day workshop held in Washington, DC, on 
June 27–28, 2012 and concluded “the potential exists to significantly improve our 
preparedness messaging strategies,”118 but that there was no “silver bullet”119 to this 
effort. The results of this workshop were not entirely surprising; in the leadership 
remarks, FEMA Administrator W. Craig Fugate stated that the 2011 FEMA National 
Household Survey provided disappointing results and that it was a “clear sign that 
changes should be made in preparedness messaging.”120  National FEMA preparedness 
surveys since 2003 have indicated that the percentage of households that have engaged in 
preparedness by developing a plan and building a kit have not increased over time,121 
116 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Get Involved,” Federal Emergency Management 
Agency Ready, accessed August 20, 2012, http://www.ready.gov/pledge.  
117 Federal Emergency Management Agency and American Red Cross, Summary Report on 
Awareness to Action: A Workshop on Motivating the Public to Prepare, February 2013, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/31359?id=7124.   
118 Ibid., 3.  
119 Ibid, 22. 
120 Ibid, 9. 
121 Ibid, 10. 
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despite the on-going campaign. The report fell short of calling the most recent efforts a 
failure, but clearly stated that change is needed. 
G. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE 
The literature review has revealed that preparedness is the necessary element 
needed for the survival of our country. It has also revealed that this necessary element has 
been left as optional for nearly everyone, including first responders, and that this is a 
problem. There are many interesting ideas on the table, but what is missing is a driving 
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IV. EXISTING PROGRAMS AND INTERESTING IDEAS 
A. THE STATUS QUO 
Research for this thesis has led to the finding that responder family preparedness, 
specifically organizational responsibility for ensuring this readiness, is miniscule or 
perhaps even non-existent in our country. By and large, first-responder agencies are not 
mandating family preparedness for their employees. If any such programs exist, they are 
not well known or prevalent in the literature. First responders are essentially no different 
than the rest of the citizenry in that their level of preparedness remains a question, albeit a 
very important one. Research has demonstrated that citizens, including first responders 
and their families, are not responding to this country’s preparedness messaging. The 
current state of affairs in the preparedness realm is one of government suggestions, 
recommendations, urgings, and offerings resulting in widespread inaction, leading to an 
overall lack of preparedness nationwide.   
1. Citizen Corps 
Citizen Corps, for instance, is the primary government strategy to get citizens 
thinking about and moving toward preparedness. It is also an example of a mediocre 
homeland security offering and illustrates the status quo in America. In January of 2002, 
the program was created under the FEMA as a “nationwide grassroots strategy to achieve 
greater community safety, preparedness, and resilience.”122 The mission of Citizen Corps 
was and remains “to harness the power of every individual through education, training, 
and volunteer service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to 
respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues and disasters of all 
kinds.”123 The program has been in existence for over a decade, and FEMA has relied on 
a questionable approach, explained in more detail below, to purporting its success. In  
 
122 Citizen Corps, “About Citizen Corps: History of Citizen Corps,” Citizen Corps, accessed August 5, 
2012, http://www.citizencorps.gov/citizencorps/index.shtm.  
123 Ibid. 
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reality, Citizen Corps has underperformed due to a variety of shortcomings including a 
low level of funding, a failure to create and implement a strategic plan, and a resistance to 
effectively evaluate the effort. 
As previously noted, Citizen Corps has lacked any substantial funding. For 
example, in 2009 FEMA dedicated $5.8 million, or only 0.5 percent of its annual budget, 
to community preparedness programs of which Citizen Corps was only a part.124  FEMA 
made it incumbent on individual Citizen Corps councils throughout the country to apply 
for additional grant funding to initiate and sustain their programs. Grant funding, 
specifically for Citizen Corps councils, has experienced a downward trend in budget 
appropriations since its original allocation of $40 million in 2004.125 By FY 2010, it was 
down to $13 million, then down to $10 million in FY 2011.126  Zero funds were 
specifically allocated in FY 2012 and FY 2013.127  The U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) explained that 16 national preparedness programs would compete for 
grant funding under one umbrella entitled “National Preparedness Grant Program.”128  
OMB cited a need for “streamlining and simplifying programs that overlap and, over 
time, have become disparate, confusing, and sometimes duplicative.”129  They also noted 
that the new grant program will require measures of effectiveness to be included in the 
grant proposal and that these grants will be tracked from inception to completion to 
demonstrate their impact.130 
In 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report to 
Congress concerning FEMA’s challenges regarding the integration of community 
124 U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], Emergency Preparedness: FEMA Faces 
Challenges Integrating Community Preparedness Programs into Its Strategic Approach (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/d10193.pdf, 3.  
125 White House, “FY 2004 Budget Fact Sheet,” news release, October 1, 2003, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031001-7.html.  
126 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Cuts, Consolidations, and Savings: Budget of the U.S. 
Government (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2012), 






                                                 
preparedness programs into its strategic approach.131  GAO reported that there were 
issues with the validity of data provided by FEMA; GAO contacted 17 supposedly active 
Citizen Corps councils and discovered that five of them were, in fact, inactive.132  GAO 
subsequently learned that FEMA relied on each state to individually provide information 
on its active councils and that there was no verification component in place. FEMA 
unsuccessfully attempted to rectify this issue with the GAO by providing a draft of a 
strategy to be used to verify that information. GAO rejected the draft due to its lack of 
specificity as to what steps FEMA was going to take to ensure that it possessed accurate 
data concerning the number of active councils.133  Citizen Corps, in its 2009 Annual 
Report, claimed that there were over 2,400 councils “registered” and that these councils 
represented 79 percent of the U.S. population.134  GOA’s small sampling of 17 councils 
revealed a significant discrepancy of nearly 30 percent, further bringing into question 
FEMA’s claim of success.  
The GAO report continued to criticize FEMA and advised Congress that FEMA 
lacked a strategy to demonstrate how its community preparedness programs fulfilled the 
need of the National Preparedness System (NPS).135  FEMA was required under the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 to establish the NPS to ensure that 
the U.S. possessed the ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters. GAO 
explained that FEMA was using an operating plan rather than a strategic plan for its 
implementation of the Citizen Corps program and that this approach lacked any method 
for gauging progress.136  The GAO explained that qualitative analysis, rather than just 
sheer numbers, would be valuable to FEMA leadership and other government decision 
makers.137 The GAO further noted that twice in 2009, it had brought this concern of 
131 GAO, Emergency Preparedness: FEMA Faces Challenges.  
132 Ibid., 9. 
133 Ibid., 11. 
134 Citizen Corps, 2009 Annual Report, accessed October 16, 2013, 
http://home.citizencorps.gov/annreports/arindex.shtm, 2.  
135 GAO, Emergency Preparedness: FEMA Faces Challenges, 16.  
136 Ibid., 
137 Ibid., 21. 
 31 
                                                 
having a strategic plan to the attention of FEMA, which agreed with its finding. 
However, FEMA failed to provide GAO with any “timelines and milestones” for 
completing this strategic plan.138  
The situation did not appear much different in 2012; FEMA was still claiming the 
success of Citizen Corps139 while using questionable metrics. The National Preparedness 
Report, dated March 2012, indicated that Citizen Corps councils existed in more than 
1,100 local, county, and tribal jurisdictions and represented over 178 million people that 
constituted 58 percent of the U.S. population.140 Upon further reading, the report also 
indicated that these councils have trained 428,500 citizens “in activities that directly 
support community resilience.”141  Using Kindt’s method previously highlighted in the 
above literature review, one discovers that this is less than 389 citizens per council or 
only .2 percent of the 178 million people that the councils claim to “represent.”  
Additional analysis of this type would have been possible if more information were 
available on Citizen Corps; to date, FEMA has only published three annual reports for 
Citizen Corps in 10 years (2002, 2004, and 2009).142  
Thus, far, the only indicator of the success or failure of the Citizen Corps has been 
in the form of problematic quantitative data. FEMA has demonstrated that the Citizen 
Corps program is low on its list of priorities. It is so low that FEMA has not adequately 
funded the program, has not developed a strategic plan to implement it nationwide, and 
has failed to evaluate it properly. The quantitative data that has been provided as a 
measure of Citizen Corps’ success is undeniably flawed and presented by FEMA in a 
biased manner. This lack of effective planning, implementation, and evaluation has set 
FEMA back 10 years in its attempt to collaborate with the U.S. citizenry.   
138 Ibid., 19. 
139 Paulette Aniskof, “Celebrating Ten Years with Citizens Corps,” FEMA Blog, January 25, 2012, 
http://blog.fema.gov/2012/01/celebrating-ten-years-with-citizen.html.  
140 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012), http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=5914, 
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2. The Potentially Ready Responder 
By moving from just citizen preparedness to responder preparedness, the U.S. 
government has acknowledged that first responders are different from the general public. 
On the surface, this seems to be a departure from the status quo and a significant step 
forward in the direction of responder family preparedness. The government has called 
upon responders and their agencies to make efforts to be adequately prepared; the Ready 
Responder initiative was launched by FEMA and DHS in 2011 under the belief that 
communities cannot be prepared unless their responders and responder families are first 
adequately prepared.143 Having an emergency supply kit, a detailed family plan, and 
being informed about what to do in potential emergencies constitutes being prepared in 
this program.144  Ready Responder specifically targets first responders and their agencies 
and lists considerations for both on its website.    
Responders are cautioned that their jobs may require them to be separated from 
their families for extended periods of time without the knowledge as to where their 
family is located or how their family is managing without them. The program stresses the 
importance of preparation at home and working with friends, neighbors, and extended 
family to ensure that the responder family is cared for in the responder’s absence.145  
Preparedness is listed as the key to reducing both responder and family stress and 
uncertainty during a disaster. It is also listed as an ingredient in allowing responders to 
properly focus on their job to increase performance and safety.146  
Similarly, agencies are cautioned that their employees may not respond for duty if 
they have questions or uncertainties about their family’s safety. The program 
recommends the formation of policy to address responder family preparedness. If such 
policy exists, it recommends an analysis concerning proper planning and preparation in 
143 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Ready Responder Toolkit, 1. 
144 Ibid., 10. 




                                                 
this area. It is also suggested that agencies make these policies clear to their responders 
and that they sponsor, in house, such preparedness programs.147   
Ready Responder does provide a detailed framework for the facilitating of both 
individual responder family preparedness and of agency-sponsored programs and policy. 
As noted above, this seems like a significant change in the status quo. Sadly though, like 
Citizen Corps and so many other programs, it represents just another government offering 
and, therefore, remains in the optional category. This is a problem. 
B. INTERESTING IDEAS AND SMART PRACTICES 
1. The Truly Ready Responder 
It is significant to note that Ready Responder is a powerful tool and an interesting 
idea. The problem lies in the fact that it seems to be underutilized. If a responder agency 
were to require family preparedness, the Ready Responder program could take on huge 
significance and provide a unified path forward for the responder community to follow. 
The program is very comprehensive, indeed, and provides a plethora of information and 
thought provoking ideas. It also provides a structured planning framework necessary for 
getting both responders and their agencies minimally prepared. This framework is 
packaged up in a 77-page document entitled the Ready Responder Toolkit, which 
contains form letters, templates, checklists, and presentation materials.148  It is scalable 
and highly adaptable to be used by virtually anyone in the first-responder community and 
even beyond. Everything in the toolkit was designed to be adopted, in part or in whole, 
by individual agencies and responders as a smart option once their buy-in was obtained. 
This would provide comprehensive and consistent planning in any responder agency 
whether it is at the city, county, state, or even federal level. In this respect, the Ready 
Responder program represents a potential smart practice when put into action. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Ready Responder Toolkit. 
 34 
                                                 
2. Reprioritizing Responder Preparedness 
Christopher Kelenske also realized the value and potential of the Ready 
Responder initiative, even though it was only in its pilot phase.149  In fact, he views this 
initiative as a standardized path toward achieving nationwide responder family 
preparedness.150  In his work, he claims that ensuring responder family preparedness is 
an agency responsibility. Kelenske determined that there is a lack of awareness and 
funding hindering these efforts. He advises that responders and responder agencies need 
specific funding and education to keep them “resilient and fully operational during a 
disaster.”151 
For Kelenske, responder family preparedness is different from general citizen 
preparedness due to the stress related to responders having to help others when their own 
families may not be adequately prepared or receiving any help.152 He states that 
responder preparedness and the strengthening of their resilience should be elevated to a 
national priority in our country and that funds be shifted from other existing programs.153 
Kelenske recommends using the Ready Responder program and proposes a method for 
financing this effort through the creation of an Emergency Responder Resilience Grant 
Program (ERRGP). He suggests that the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) 
under DHS create this funding stream.154 This recommendation is an interesting idea 
since funding is likely to be a major obstacle for many, if not most, responder agencies. 
Personal preparedness for responders, according to Kelenske’s recommendations, 
“should be implemented as a component of annual training, job readiness, and 
performance management.”155  He developed a comprehensive plan for getting responder 
families prepared through their direct engagement in order to educate them on policies 
149 Kelenske, “Emergency Responder,” 77. 
150 Ibid., 79. 
151 Ibid., 77. 
152 Ibid., 78. 
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and available support during a disaster. His plan advances the requirement of 72-hour 
preparedness kits for both the responders and their families.156  Written plans for the 
families, coupled with web-based training for the responder and available to family 
members, are also included in his advanced preparation.157  To measure effectiveness, 
these efforts would be tested during realistic drills and exercises that include family 
members.158  These are all interesting ideas worthy of consideration. 
To assist in implementing this plan, Kelenske recommends taking a “community 
approach.”159 The community he is referring to consists of all first responders and their 
families, regardless of agency or discipline. He explains that they all share common 
interests and similar concerns with the desire of solving this dilemma.160 Demonstrating 
his belief in the “diffusion of innovation theory,” Kelenske recommends sharing 
successful innovations with the larger first-responder community.161 This is a sound 
recommendation and highlights the power of sharing information and the virtue of 
collaboration in the adoption of smart practices. 
Kelenske’s approach is straight-forward and puts the onus of responder family 
preparedness on the responders and their agencies themselves. He draws the line between 
citizen preparedness and responder family preparedness and makes an argument for this 
to be an elevated federal government priority. Realizing that the Ready Responder 
initiative needs a boost and an incentive to attract the attention of agency administrators, 
Kelenske recommends that DHS reprioritize responder family preparedness, moving it to 
a higher level of attention.162  He challenges DHS to reallocate funding to further this 
agenda.163 These are all powerful points.   
156 Ibid. 
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3. The Military Model 
Kelenske’s plan could be enhanced through the addition of a support element for 
responders and their families. Butler et al. were wise in their assessment that the military 
model of family support provides value for the first-responder community.164 The USAF 
Family Care Program, as highlighted by Kindt, requires that service members possess a 
plan for the care of their families in the event that they are called for deployment.165  
Members who are married to other service members, single parents, and those with 
family members who have special needs must have continuously reviewed, feasible plans 
to support their deployment to ensure that the service member remains immediately 
deployable. According to Kindt, the intent of these plans is to minimize undue stress on 
the service members while they are not home.166  Though there are clear differences 
between warfighters and first responders, such as deployment to a distant war zone, there 
exist similarities in their families having to potentially face a disaster without their 
presence or protection. This is an interesting idea and applicable to the first-responder 
community. 
4. Family Support Measures  
Nancy Demme, through her 2007 thesis at CHDS, also addressed family support 
mechanisms and came up with low-cost solutions to making this happen. She determined 
that police, when faced with responding to a bioterrorism event, would have major 
concerns for their families and that this could serve as an impediment to their 
response.167  To remedy this problem she recommended, in part, that agencies form a 
family support unit (FSU) similar to that commonly used in the fire service.168  Demme 
explained that deployed firefighters in urban search and rescue (USAR) teams have their 
families cared for by FSU personnel. Demme proposed that FSU members check in with  
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responder families on a daily basis to assess their needs. She stated that FSU could bring 
necessities, such as food, water, and medicine to these families and also transport them to 
doctor visits or medical facilities.169  
To staff FSU, Demme recommended pulling existing personnel from other 
assignments that would be affected by a biological incident; she cited school resource 
officers, crossing guards, and court officers as prime examples since schools and courts 
would be closed.170  In addition, Demme stated that extra FSU personnel could be drawn 
from light duty officers, retired officers, and civilian volunteers.171  This is an interesting 
idea and a wise use of available staffing during a disaster. It is also a wise financial move 
since these personnel are available employees and not an additional expenditure.  
To test the effectiveness of FSU, Demme suggested that the agency conduct a dry 
run—a two-day exercise to test the capabilities.172 However, she conceded that it would 
be hard to replicate real conditions and that some details would have to be simulated. 
Demme stated that a large snow storm would replicate many of the conditions that would 
exist in a large-scale disaster, such as schools being closed, children staying home, 
families needing emergency supplies, and officers leaving their families for longer than 
usual periods of time.173  A test on a smaller-scale incident would greatly assist in 
identifying any possible weaknesses or areas for improvement for future large-scale 
incidents.   
In addition to the creation of a family support element, Demme also 
recommended that responder agencies record and retain important family information in 
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such as “name, address, age, schools, allergies, doctors, special needs, contact 
information, etc.”175  She suggested that it be updated when changes occur or annually at 
a minimum. This is another simple, yet effective idea. 
5. The Not-So-Cowardly Lion 
Ready Responder, Kelenske, and Demme represent recent thinking concerning 
how to get first responders and their families prepared. Each gives potential solutions and 
encourages responder agencies to take a larger role in getting their personnel prepared. 
This represents a real possibility; agency by agency, through collaboration, responder 
families could achieve preparedness. Sometimes it takes a reexamination of the status 
quo to adjust efforts and motivate the right individuals. This is currently underway in the 
realm of citizen preparedness. 
In the 2013 FEMA and American Red Cross Summary Report on Awareness to 
Action: A Workshop on Motivating the Public to Prepare, the top recommendations for 
defining preparedness success were survival, self-sufficiency and empowerment, and 
changing the social norm.176  FEMA Administrator Fugate stated that a new social norm 
of “being prepared” would be his ideal outcome.177 He stated that changes were needed 
in current messaging strategies; the report pointed to the idea that segmented messaging 
would be the new strategy as opposed to a blanket message continually repeated to the 
American public.178  Along these lines, the summary report highlighted Dr. David 
Abramson of the National Center for Disaster Preparation at Columbia University. He 
analyzed FEMA’s surveys and concluded that there are differences in the perceived roles 
of citizens in a disaster when it comes to messaging.179  He categorized people as either 
“lions,” “lone wolves,” or “lambs.”180  Lions comprised 20 percent, and these individuals 
perceived themselves as destined to lead others. Lone wolves, 60 percent of those 
175 Ibid.. 
176 Federal Emergency Management Agency and American Red Cross, Summary Report, 5. 
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surveyed, stated that they would depend upon themselves. Expecting others to show them 
the way and provide them with assistance, lambs comprised the final 20 percent.181  
The above workshop participants agreed that segmenting the intended audiences 
to promote the preparedness message may be an effective strategy, and they utilized 
Abramson’s three categories182 to explain how they would approach the varied groups. 
The participants concluded that targeting the lone wolves could provide the biggest return 
on investment since it was the largest group and that lions would emerge from this group. 
They also viewed lions as “low hanging fruit” and “potential force multipliers.”183  The 
same report mentioned using “trusted messengers” as a conduit for spreading the 
preparedness message into the community; local first responders were listed in this 
category along with the faith community, employers, educators, elected officials, medical 
officials, scientists, and academia.184 
By virtue of their career choice, first responders are most definitely lions. On a 
daily basis, they interact with a broad range of citizens while expecting to take action to 
protect and care for others. By developing a culture of preparedness within the first-
responder community, these envoys would permeate their surrounding communities and 
demonstrate the confidence and strength that comes along with being prepared. In this 
fashion and echoing the recommendation of the Ready Responder program,185 these 
individuals could serve as role models for preparedness. These ready responders would 
have already thought about preparedness for their own families, made critical decisions, 
and understood the importance of continually reevaluating their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
This realization that certain segments of society will embrace preparedness and 
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preparedness, the government can focus its efforts and funding on matters that may 
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V. ISSUES UNCOVERED BY RESEARCH  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Though peripheral at first glance, the issue of changing family structures and 
women entering the workforce as first responders was found to be germane to this study 
and worthy of inclusion. In addition, parallels from other government preparedness 
campaigns provided crucial support for the belief that “optional” is a problem and that 
some measures need to be mandatory to be effective. For instance, the federal funding 
and eventual mandate for police officers to wear bulletproof vests provides insight into 
the idea of effective policy development. Seatbelt use, like that of bulletproof vests, was 
also optional until government stepped in. By mandating seatbelt use, state governments, 
with some prompting and incentives186 from the federal government, took a significant 
step and achieved results.187 
B. CHANGING FAMILY STRUCTURES 
Lewis M. Killian’s 1952 article accurately described the potential dilemma faced 
by first responders during his time. These men were confronted with the possibility of 
having to choose between first serving their wives and children during a catastrophe or 
serving their communities first. His conclusion that it may be impossible for responders 
to serve in two roles at the same time was relevant then and has taken on deeper 
significance ever since. Killian’s view of the problem was naturally in the context of his 
time, and much has changed in the last five decades. This increasing significance of 
Killian’s claim is due in part to the changing family structures in America and the 
acceptance and integration of women into roles as first responders.  
In the 1950s, first-responder roles were male-occupied; firemen and policemen 
were just that, men. In a domestic relationship, females usually took on the role of 
186 Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr. and David J. Houston, “Federalism and Safety on America’s 
Highways,” Publius 39, no. 1 (2009): 117–137. 
187 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, “Traffic 
Safety Facts, Seatbelt Use in 2012—Overall Results,” November 2012, accessed July 16, 2013, 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811691.pdf.  
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“homemaker” and focused their efforts on caring for their children. This was the era of 
June Cleaver of Leave it to Beaver and Harriet Nelson of Father Knows Best. This 
predominant family structure was the societal norm and framed Killian’s problem and 
analysis. Since that time, many females have left the house and currently comprise 
approximately half of the American workforce.188  This number is up from 33.9 percent 
in 1950.189  In addition, this trend has been especially true for women with young 
children.190  In 1948, approximately 17 percent of married mothers were active 
participants in the American workforce.191  This percentage has greatly increased over 
time and peaked at 70 percent in 1995.192  As a result, today, there is a much greater 
reliance on third parties and daycare providers to care for children while both parents are 
at work. In 2010, in the United States, there were only five million stay-at-home 
mothers193 with working husbands in the U.S. out of a total of 157.2 million women,194 
82.8 million of them being mothers of all ages,195 65.1 million of them being married.196   
In addition to entering the workforce, females have transitioned into the first-
responder community as firefighters and police officers. These gender-neutral terms are a 
societal indicator that these roles are no longer viewed as exclusively for men. The first 
188 “The Harried Life of the Working Mother,” October 1, 2009, Pew Research, Social & 
Demographic Trends, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/10/01/the-harried-life-of-the-working-mother/.  
189 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “Changes in Men’s and Women’s Labor 
Force Participation Rates,” January 10, 2007, accessed August 22, 2013, 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.htm. 
190 Rose M. Kreider and Diana B. Elliott, Historical Changes in Stay-at-Home Mothers: 1969 to 2009 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), 4.  
191 Sharon R. Cohany and Emy Sok, “Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of 
Infants,” Monthly Labor Review (February 2007), 9. 
192 Ibid. 
193 U.S. Census Bureau, “Families and Living Arrangements Main,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed 
August 10, 2013, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html. 
194 U.S. Census Bureau, “Profile America Facts for Features: Women’s History Month: March 2011 
(CB11-FF.04)” January 26, 2011, U.S. Census Bureau, accessed August 10, 2013, 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb11-ff04.html. 
195 Ibid. 
196 U.S. Census Bureau, “America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2010,” 2010, U.S. Census 
Bureau, accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-
fam/cps2010.html.  
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female police officer was hired in 1891.197  Slowly over the years, other female police 
officers were hired throughout the country. For a long time, they were typically assigned 
desk duties and other clerical work while wearing uniforms consisting of high-heeled 
shoes and skirts.198  It was not until 1969 that two female police officers left the office 
and went on patrol in Indianapolis.199  This signaled the beginning of the movement 
toward women doing the same job as their male counterparts. Today, women represent 
14 percent of the total number of police officers in the U.S.200  The U.S. Census indicated 
that in 2009 there were 111,000 female police officers and 9,700 female firefighters in 
America.201 
There are now cases with both parents fulfilling the role of first responder, and the 
potential exists for them to be simultaneously conflicted between their family and work 
roles. Both responders could be subject to recall by their agencies that are also heavily 
depending on them. The alternative of leaving the children at home with their mother 
may no longer be an available option. In addition, daycare providers typically close 
during times of inclement weather such as hurricanes and blizzards, leading to the 
likelihood that they would not remain an available option during a non-weather-related 
community crisis. This makes planning all the more important. 
Another aggravating factor and important aspect of change since Killian’s time is 
the number of single parents that are raising children. Divorce rates more than doubled in 
the second half of the last century; between 1950 and 1990, this number rose from 11 to 
197 National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund, “Important Dates in Law Enforcement 
History,” last modified March 2009, National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund, accessed August 
10, 2013, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/impdates.html. 
198 Dean Scoville, “The First Female Patrol Officers,” Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine, 
September 21, 2012, accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.policemag.com/channel/women-in-law-
enforcement/articles/2012/09/the-first-female-patrol-officers.aspx. 
199 National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund, “Important Dates.” 
200 Scoville, “The First Female Patrol Officers.” 
201 U.S. Census Bureau, “Profile America.” Jeremy Greenwood and Nezih Guner, “Marriage and 
Divorce since World War II: Analyzing the Role of Technological Progress on the Formation of 
Households” (PCS Working Paper Series PCS 08-01, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10772. 
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23 divorces per 1,000 married women between the ages of 18 and 64.202  Additionally, 
far fewer Americans are married today; 82 percent of Americans were married in 1950, 
compared to 62 percent in 2000 of the same category of females.203  In addition to this 
changing marital trend, many individuals are choosing to have children or adopt children 
outside of the institution of marriage, or even sometimes outside of a relationship. In 
2011, 40.7 percent of all children born in the U.S. were born out of wedlock.204 In the 
same year, there were 13.6 million single parents raising children.205  Surely, a number of 
first responders, too, are single parents and sole providers for their children. This family 
structure issue presents a twist on that described by Killian and makes for an even more 
complex dilemma with fewer alternatives. It is no longer just about leaving the children 
at home with their mother. Without careful pre-planning for these parents, there may be 
no other alternative available to simply not reporting for duty as a responder. 
C. THE PROBLEM WITH OPTIONAL 
There is a critical need for a mindset shift regarding how preparedness is being 
viewed, particularly within the first-responder culture. Currently, preparedness is seen as 
an option for everyone instead of a necessity. As demonstrated above, there are potential 
negative cascading effects for communities if their responders are among the unprepared. 
An examination of the U.S. government approach to individual preparedness illustrates 
that this current optional mindset will certainly not succeed in achieving widespread 
responder family preparedness without some type of intervention. This status quo 
approach reveals that there is a problem with optional.  
If responder family preparedness is so important, the government should take it 
out of the “optional” category. This is not a new concept; the government has done it in 
202 Jeremy Greenwood and Nezih Guner, “Marriage and Divorce since World War II: Analyzing the 
Role of Technological Progress on the Formation of Households” (PCS Working Paper Series PCS 08-01, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10772, 1.  
203 Ibid. 
204 Joyce A. Martin, Brady E. Hamilton, Stephanie J. Ventura, Michelle J. K. Osterman, and T. J. 
Mathews, “Births: Final Data for 2011,” National Vital Statistics Reports 62, no. 1 (2013), Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01.pdf. 
205 U.S. Census Bureau, “Profile America.” 
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the past. Rocky Lopes, formerly of the American Red Cross, stated that successful 
awareness campaigns in America, such as seatbelts and anti-smoking, were successful 
because these campaigns were coupled with legislation. However, Lopes contended that 
readiness behavior cannot be legislated.206  This statement holds true for the American 
public in general; however, responder agencies can certainly mandate this behavior for 
their employees. They already do it with other such fit-for-duty requirements, such as 
weight and appearance standards, fitness testing, and continuing educational 
requirements. 
1. Bulletproof Vest Analogy 
This would not be the first time that DSP mandated an agency-wide individual 
preparedness requirement for its personnel. A simple analogy can be drawn between go-
kits and the wearing of bulletproof vests, otherwise known as bullet-resistance vests or 
body armor. Initially, many police agencies believed that it was a good idea for officers 
to wear vests. Though many agencies, due to the cost of several hundred dollars per vest, 
could not afford to provide them to all officers, they highly encouraged officers to 
purchase them on their own. Over time, there were many stories of officers walking away 
from what would have been fatal encounters due to the protection of their vest. Over the 
years, bulletproof vests were gradually provided, mostly through or in part by federal 
grants, and became a normal part of the uniform. Since 1999, over one million vests, 
totaling $277 million in federal funds, were purchased by more than 13,000 police 
jurisdictions in the U.S. through the collaborative Bulletproof Vest Partnership offered by 
the U.S. Department of Justice. It is important to note that there was a string attached by 
the federal government in that the agencies had to develop “mandatory wear” policies to 
qualify for the funding.207   
During the 10-year period spanning from 2003 through 2012, a total of 1,540 
police officers were killed in the line of duty in the U.S. The leading cause of death was 
206 Hudson, Emergency Preparedness, 18. 
207 Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, “Bulletproof Vest Partnership,” Office of 
Justice Programs, accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bvpbasi/. 
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gunfire with 564 officers being shot and killed.208  The wearing of bulletproof vests can 
and does mitigate this threat. As such, it is one proven method for lowering the risk of 
police officers being killed by a bullet. The National Institute of Justice reported that over 
3,000 police officers have had their lives saved by bulletproof vests in the last three 
decades.209  The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) reported, that, in FY-2012 alone, 33 
police and/or correctional officers in 20 different states had their lives saved by their 
bulletproof vest.210 Though this statistic includes correctional officers, it is clear that 
these saves represent a very small percentage of the 900,000 plus sworn police officers in 
the U.S.211  Numbers aside, this preparedness effort surely made a positive difference in 
their lives and that of their loved ones.   
It should go without saying that bulletproof vests need to be worn in order for 
them to be effective in saving lives. Along this line of thinking, the Department of Justice 
attached the “mandatory wear” policies to gain compliance from officers receiving vests. 
This preparedness effort progressed from being something that was a good idea, to 
something highly recommended and even urged, yet still voluntary, to something 
mandated by the organization through policy. The reasoning behind the requirement was 
clear—wearing a bulletproof vest can save an officer’s life.    
DuPont, the creator of the lifesaving fabric Kevlar manufactured for the vests, 
sums it up: Kevlar is “about resilience, strength, saving the day, and helping keep people 
safe from harm.”212 These ideals reveal a relatively new change in mindset within the 
policing community; however, there is clear evidence of a paradigm shift on a much 
broader scale. The first question many people ask after hearing about a police officer 
208 National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund, “Causes of Law Enforcement Deaths,” National Law 
Enforcement Memorial Fund, accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-
data/causes.html. 
209 National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, “Body Armor,” last modified July 12, 
2013, National Institute of Justice, accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.nij.gov/topics/technology/body-
armor/.  
210 Office of Justice Programs, “Bulletproof Vest Partnership.” 
211 National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund, “Law Enforcement Facts,” National Law Enforcement 
Memorial Fund, accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/. 
212 DuPont Company, “Kevlar Brand,” last modified 2013, DuPont Company, accessed July 2, 2013, 
http://www.dupont.com/products-and-services/fabrics-fibers-nonwovens/fibers/brands/kevlar.html. 
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being shot is: “Was the officer wearing a vest?”  The public, too, has bought into this 
preparedness campaign and has an expectation that police officers are consistently 
wearing this protective equipment.    
Similarly, go-kits can also play a role in keeping people safe and saving lives. As 
such, they need to become mandatory survival items in the first-responder community. 
This assessment of needs should follow the same path as bulletproof vests from 
suggested, to recommended, to highly encouraged, then supplied, and eventually 
mandated. Most police officers that wear bulletproof vests do not get shot. In fact, they 
have a low risk of being shot; however, they wear a vest to enhance their safety and 
realize that to go without one is not worth the risk to them or their families. Of course, it 
helps that their agencies do not give them the option. As demonstrated earlier, there is a 
problem with optional. This same risk-management logic needs to be applied to the go-kit 
and the family preparedness effort in general. Simply put, it is not worth the risk for 
responder families and, subsequently for responder organizations, to be unprepared. The 
benefit of having prepared responders outweighs the cost.  
2. Seatbelt Analogy 
Looking through this same preparedness optic, one realizes that DSP was already 
involved in another mandatory preparedness campaign besides bulletproof vests. Before 
it became the law to wear seatbelts in Delaware in 1992,213 the decision had already been 
made to increase the safety and crash preparedness of DSP personnel through the 
mandate to wear seatbelts while operating divisional vehicles. The progression followed a 
similar path as described in the bulletproof vest example. It was deemed a good idea, 
encouraged at some point, and eventually required by the organization. Better crash 
preparedness was achieved through a policy mandate. 
Seatbelts save lives, and there is plenty of evidence to support this fact; however, 
not everyone in the U.S. voluntarily joined in this preparedness effort. Despite the 
encouraging, urging, and public awareness campaigns launched by the government, many 
213 Department of Insurance, State of Delaware, “Implementation of Seal (sic) Belt Legislation,” Auto 
Bulletin no. 8, (January 1992), Department of Insurance, accessed October 18, 2013, 
http://www.delawareinsurance.gov/departments/documents/bulletins/autobull8.pdf.  
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people refused, and still refuse, to buckle up. The U.S. government began with the 
assumption that citizens would buy into the crash preparedness logic, but it learned that 
voluntary compliance was not achieved on a broad scale. Mandated compliance was 
thought as the better option to increase overall seatbelt use. State governments began to 
tell citizens to be better prepared for a crash or face fines. In essence, the Click-It or 
Ticket campaign214 is government’s way of changing the mindset, one ticket at a time. 
Since all vehicles manufactured in the U.S. since March 1, 1967 are required to have 
seatbelts,215 this mechanism for crash preparedness exists; citizens just need to make the 
effort to utilize the survival tools—the seatbelts. Seatbelt use has been steadily increasing 
from 58 percent in 1994 to 86 percent in 2012.216 This is evidence that a mandate has a 
much higher rate of achieving preparedness as compared to a recommendation or urging.   
One could argue that seatbelts differ from bulletproof vests in that there is a 
significant cost involved in the latter, whereas seatbelts are already provided. Again, a 
government mandate is responsible for seatbelts being installed in vehicles at all. This 
likely rested upon a government assumption that citizens would use them if installed. It 
can also be countered that citizens most likely paid for this equipment in increased costs 
of automobiles. A similar transition is currently underway in the mandated use of child 
safety restraints. Drivers are required to possess and properly utilize these devices to 
ensure crash preparedness for their child passengers. Since September of 2002, the U.S. 
government has required the lower anchors and tethers for children (LATCH) system to 
be included in manufacturing of all vehicles. This was done with the intent to ease child 
seat installation and avoid injuries due to improper usage.217 Some vehicle 
manufacturers, such as Dodge, have started to equip some of their vehicles with 
214 State of Delaware, “2013 Click It or Ticket and Seat Belts,” last modified May 16, 2013, State of 
Delaware, accessed October 18, 2013, http://ohs.delaware.gov/seatbelts.  
215 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, “Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and Regulations,” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
accessed September 10, 2013, http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/import/fmvss/.  
216 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Traffic Safety Facts.” 
217 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, “Lower 
Anchor and Tethers for Children (LATCH) Restraint System,” National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, accessed September 10, 2013, http://www.nhtsa.gov/Safety/LATCH.  
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integrated booster seats for small children as standard equipment,218 but this has not yet 
been mandated by the government. 
It is a fact that the U.S. government has intervened in the past when safety 
measures were not being embraced by the public; seatbelts serve as the prime example. It 
is also a fact that the government has gone beyond simply urging police officers to wear 
vests; they made it happen by providing funding and issuing mandates that officers wear 
those vests. Like the U.S. government in the above cases, local and state governments 
need to realize that this policy gap concerning first-responder families is a liability to our 
homeland security on every level. They should move toward directing resources to fix it 
through policy and implementation. This is an individual agency responsibility; however, 
the U.S. government has a stake and can provide additional resources and funding.  
D. SUMMARY OF ISSUES UNCOVERED 
The above issues were uncovered through research on the topic of responder 
family preparedness. Killian’s potential dilemma of role abandonment was originally 
presented in the time and space of 1952. Since then, much has changed and not in the 
favor of responders experiencing any less potential role conflict; quite the contrary is the 
modern case. Both the wearing of bulletproof vests by police officers and seatbelts by 
vehicle occupants represent successful major government preparedness campaigns. These 
movements were successful because they achieved an effective paradigm shift toward 
increasing safety through the adoption of smart practices. This mindset shift was, no 
doubt, considerably aided by a mandate to comply and by the removal of the behavior 
from the optional category. In some instances, as demonstrated above, there is a problem 
with optional, and responder family preparedness is one of them.  
 
218 Dodge, “2013 Journey,” last modified 2013, Dodge, accessed September 10, 2013, 
http://www.dodge.com/en/2013/journey/interior/. 
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VI. PROPOSED POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Delaware State Police (DSP) needs to fully commit to ensuring that troopers 
and their families are adequately prepared to live through a large-scale disaster via a 
mandate of family preparedness. Both the physical and mental needs of the troopers must 
be addressed through the development and execution of a comprehensive strategy to 
achieve this end. The following provides a holistic approach to achieving minimal 
preparedness and building resilience at a relatively low monetary cost. The strategy is 
comprised of three parts. The first part is the development of a system to collect family 
information that adequately documents responder family data, plans, and special needs. 
The second involves the creation of family liaisons to serve as the bridge between 
deployed troopers and their families. The third and final part is accomplished through the 
issuing of “go-kits,” which include the essential equipment recommended by the U.S. 
government to survive without government assistance for a few days.      
B. FAMILY INFORMATION SYSTEM 
It is not only wise, but also essential for the division to know what family 
concerns troopers physically leave behind when they report for duty during a crisis. 
These same issues and concerns are what they bring mentally with them when they 
respond. Simple details contained in a basic and standardized emergency plan, such as 
contact information, the intended location of family members, and any special needs, can 
document very valuable information and provide the last minute assurance that 
everything is under control. The plan also provides a good starting point for the trooper to 
make the transition into work mode. 
The military’s method, as noted by Kindt,219 holds significant value for 
demonstrating the importance of standardizing this important information and making it 
available to DSP. Kindt highlighted the requirement to have these plans in place for all 
219 Kindt, Building Population. 
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service members subject to deployment, DSP’s version of essential personnel. He noted 
that such members with extraordinary circumstances such as dual service member 
parents, single parents, and caregivers for family members with special needs, necessitate 
a higher level of review to assess and ensure their availability for deployment.220 Kindt is 
a vocal advocate of utilizing proven strategies from the military in non-military 
applications.221 This concept is a prime example of something that DSP can certainly use 
and should adopt. 
As Kelenske points out, the Ready Responder program has great potential and 
provides the framework222 for establishing a standardized approach to achieving 
nationwide responder family preparedness.223  Since the Ready Responder Toolkit was 
built with just this purpose in mind, much of the planning work has already been done for 
DSP. The toolkit is intended to be adopted and/or modified, in whole or in part. DSP can 
certainly benefit from this existing structure. 
The collected information can be entered and stored on a web-based form that can 
rapidly and readily be developed, in house, by the DSP Information Support Section. 
Like numerous other DSP applications, this Family Preparedness Information form could 
be accessed by troopers via the DSP Intranet and easily updated, while being similarly 
reviewed and evaluated by administrative personnel. Hard copies could also be kept in 
the event of an electronic system failure. Using Demme’s recommendation, this review 
process needs to be periodic, yearly at a minimum,224 to account for unanticipated 
disasters. However, anticipated emergencies, such as impending hurricanes and winter 
storms, provide the impetus to further evaluate the trooper family preparedness status. 
The Planning and Research Section, which is located at DSP-HQ and includes inspection 
and accreditation responsibilities, would be a natural fit to oversee and manage this 
program. The section already conducts annual personnel, equipment, and 
220 Ibid., 13. 
221 Ibid., 15. 
222 Kelenske, “Emergency Responder,” 3. 
223 Ibid., 79. 
224 Demme, “Government Expectations,” 61. 
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paperwork/administrative inspections statewide. These inspections would also be an 
appropriate mechanism to ensure that all family preparedness plans and information are 
current. The system would be engineered to encourage continuous updates, but the annual 
inspections would act as a failsafe to ensure that the information on file is reviewed and 
validated for accuracy. 
This information collection system does not need to be overly complicated to be 
effective. It should capture the trooper’s dependent information, including current 
addresses and telephone numbers. Other emergency contact information, such as that of 
close friends and nearest relatives, as well as alternate evacuation addresses, should also 
be documented. Along with this standard information, special needs information should 
be recorded and highlighted so that special plans and considerations can be given to make 
accommodation for these non-typical needs. Special needs may include scenarios, such as 
individuals with limited mobility, oxygen tanks, and other significant medical conditions 
necessitating ongoing treatments or prescribed medication. Such examples include 
chemotherapy, insulin injections, kidney dialysis, and respiratory therapy. Since much of 
this information is considered personal and confidential, the information system needs to 
be protected and partitioned so that troopers can view only their entered information and 
not that of their co-workers. Those troopers with administrative oversight or management 
responsibilities will have access to all information with the requirement that this 
information only be used for the intended purpose. 
As mentioned above, the information collected on the web-based forms will 
ensure that troopers have thought about preparedness, made decisions, documented those 
decisions, and provided DSP with pertinent information and plans concerning the welfare 
of their families during a time of crisis. DSP Headquarters, using the standardized format, 
can review and evaluate these plans for all troopers using the same criteria statewide to 
ensure that this is getting accomplished and that adequate and proper information is being 
documented. For example, a trooper with family members in an adjacent state, out of 
harm’s way, who has opted to relocate his/her family during an anticipated hurricane 
affecting Delaware, would be known by DSP to be much better prepared to work during 
the hurricane than a single trooper with a small child who normally relies on a daycare 
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provider in the affected zone. A trooper who had not given the matter much thought 
would be required to think about it, for everyone’s benefit. 
C. FAMILY LIAISON TROOPERS 
Once away from their loved ones, the troopers and their families will be 
connected through the newly designated Family Liaison Troopers. These specialized 
cross-trained troopers will have the sole responsibility of being the bridge between the 
trooper and his/her family during these times. In reality, the family is not the only party 
who will possibly be in harm’s way during this event. The liaisons will ensure effective 
two-way communication since the welfare of the troopers will also be on the minds of 
their families. It is important to note that these liaisons are part of the DSP family; 
therefore, their compassion and commitment can be expected to be at the highest levels 
since their loved ones could share the same dilemma.   
Following the idea proposed by Demme in the creation of her Family Support 
Unit, DSP Family Liaison Troopers will be established as a part-time unit and members 
will be selected from existing DSP personnel.225 This would be consistent with the 
staffing of other part-time positions, such as SCUBA divers, hostage negotiators, and 
bomb technicians. Fifteen troopers would be a preferable unit complement; that number 
would provide five liaisons per county drawing membership from throughout the state. 
Again, following Demme’s line of thinking, it would be wise to staff these positions or 
provide support to them though the 25 existing school resource officers (SROs) 
positioned throughout the state. Since most schools would be shut down during a 
crisis,226 only to be reopened as evacuation shelters, the SROs would provide the much-
needed staffing and support in this area without depleting patrol or investigative units. 
Another existing part-time unit, the DSP Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) 
team could enhance the overall effectiveness of the liaisons and step in when their 
specialized skills are needed. CISM is comprised of 13 troopers and six civilians trained 
in accordance with the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, which has the 
225 Ibid., 66. 
226 Ibid., 64. 
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mission of minimizing the harmful effects of job-related stress, traumatic stress, and 
personal stressors on DSP personnel and other emergency responders.227  
DSP would internally develop a training curriculum. Cost would be very minimal 
and would not be an issue impacting the creation of these positions. Similarly, ongoing 
and updated training would be conducted semi-annually to keep the liaisons current in 
their part-time roles. This training would include scenarios and role-playing to exercise 
and evaluate the liaisons’ skills. In addition, the liaisons could be kept abreast of any 
informational or programmatic changes in the interim through the existing DSP intranet 
and statewide email system.   
D. ISSUED GO-KITS  
To avoid any speculation as to whether troopers’ families are adequately equipped 
physically, DSP will issue standardized “go-kits” to all troopers as part of their issued 
gear. These kits will be inventoried and inspected yearly in the same fashion as other 
preparedness equipment such as gas masks and personal protective clothing. This type of 
inspection is already part of the DSP culture, as troopers already have their uniforms, 
weapons, patrol vehicles, and required vehicle contents inspected and documented bi-
monthly by their immediate supervisors.  
The kits will contain the essentials recommended by FEMA such as water 
containers, non-perishable food, flashlight, hand-crank radio, first-aid kit, and toiletries, 
among other items.228  An adequate kit for a family of four retails commercially for 
approximately $150–200. Food and water supplies can be supplemented for larger 
families as necessary. Go-kits are comprised of everyday items and off-the-shelf goods; 
therefore, they can be rapidly assembled and distributed to troopers. The key is 
assembling and distributing them well before an impending or sudden crisis and 
maintaining them to create a continuous state of preparedness. Snow shovels and 
generators are common items and readily available in hardware stores, but scarce prior to 
227 Francis L. Fuscellaro, II, “Delaware State Police Critical Incident Stress Management Team,” last 
modified May 1, 2012, Delaware State Police, accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://dsp.delaware.gov/CISM.shtml. 
228 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Build a Kit.” 
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an impending blizzard. Similarly, batteries fill the shelves at stores, except when a 
hurricane is inbound. Grocery and hardware stores routinely experience a flurry of near-
frenzied shoppers prior to an anticipated large storm. Many heed the warning and decide 
to prepare at the very last minute. This is a risky behavior and not true preparedness. 
Another consideration that needs to be addressed is the shelf life of a go-kit. 
Primarily, this relates to the non-perishable food goods and batteries that actually do have 
expiration dates and are not indefinitely viable. Due to this factor, there will be periodic 
replacement costs; however, these costs will be minimal compared to the initial 
investment and should not be viewed as an impediment. Annual inspections will assist in 
ensuring that kits are serviceable and up-to-date. 
Aside from the government recommended go-kit contents, two additional critical 
items will be added: a 100-watt power inverter and a two-way radio with an approximate 
direct range of 35 miles. Recognizing that automobiles can easily be used as a generator 
with the simple addition of a power inverter, this would solve any short-term power 
outage issues and would provide a temporary mechanism for charging many portable 
electronic devices. A 100-watt inverter retails for approximately $50. A low cost two-
way radio, programmed to a specific DSP-monitored channel, would provide a backup 
communications link with or without radio tower functionality. Mobile troopers, acting 
under direction of the Family Liaison Troopers, would be able to conduct family roll calls 
and status checks via this inexpensive and effective backup communication system. The 
fact that Delaware is very flat and only 96 miles long and at most 35 miles wide,229 
coupled with the fact that all troopers and their families are required to reside in the state, 
make a 35-mile range appear to be sufficient to accomplish this backup capability. Such 
radios, generally equipped with multiple channel options, are readily available on the 
commercial market and are generally sold in pairs for approximately $60. The cost 
benefit of these items makes them very worthy of the investment. These ~$300 kits 
would ensure that troopers who are leaving their families are doing so with the 
229 State of Delaware, “Delaware Geography,” State of Delaware, accessed September 10, 2013, 
http://www.delaware.gov/facts/geo.shtml.  
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knowledge that their families have the essentials necessary to ride out a disaster or to take 
with them if they choose to or are forced to evacuate their homes.   
E. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The above strategy provides purely for minimal preparedness within DSP, but it is 
a step in the right direction. The development of an information system and the creation 
of the family liaisons are in-house projects that could be accomplished in a short period 
of time. The issuing of go-kits would be contingent upon a funding source. The initial 
outlay of funds to equip 670 troopers would be significant; however, the subsequent 
annual cost would be minimal. Kits could be recycled from retiring troopers to active 
troopers, and this number would be predictable as it relates to DSP’s authorized staffing 
numbers, which regulates new hires to replace retirees or fill vacancies. This financial 
issue will be the largest internal hurdle for the implementation. With a conservative target 
price of approximately $300, DSP would need to allocate approximately $201,000 to 
equip 670 troopers with a kit.   
To test the effectiveness of the new program, as suggested by Demme, DSP 
would conduct dry runs to test these capabilities.230  Family liaisons could be activated, 
could contact families and troopers on patrol using information contained on the Family 
Preparedness Information forms, and could confirm that the families have possession of 
the go-kits. This type of exercise could eventually evolve into more detailed testing and 
validation procedures. As Demme advises, a large snow storm would replicate many of 
the conditions that would exist in a large-scale disaster, such as schools being closed, 
children staying home, families needing emergency supplies, and officers leaving their 
families for longer than usual periods of time.231  Tropical storms and hurricanes would 
also provide testing grounds for this program. In fact, the test may actually evolve into a 
real activation of the program since it is impossible to predict nature. 
 
230 Demme, “Government Expectations,” 66. 
231 Ibid., 66–67. 
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VII. CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
A. FUNDING ISSUES 
1. Initial Considerations 
No doubt, there will be challenges that will serve as roadblocks hindering this 
preparedness effort. As in most cases, funding will be the most challenging aspect of this 
project; forcing employees to do something is one thing, but forcing them to pay for it is 
another. Accordingly, DSP should bear the costs of this program and provide go-kits to 
its troopers. As mentioned above, the initial price tag for this effort would be 
approximately $200,000. With an annual budget of over 133 million dollars,232 DSP may 
be able provide this funding; however, this is by no means guaranteed and other 
alternatives must be explored.   
A possible solution to defraying costs would be grant funding and the utilization 
of existing government contracts and/or pricing. However, the reality is that a primary 
funding source first needs to be established. The process involved in introducing the idea 
and convincing government entities, such as the state legislature and the budgeting office, 
that this is a wise endeavor may consume valuable time and delay implementation. 
Therefore, anything that takes the financial burden off of these government bodies would 
be seen as a favorable move. A preferable solution may involve the creation of new and 
previously untapped funding sources and partnerships as an alternative to traditional 
government funding. The U.S. government recommends building public-private 
partnerships.233  Other similar business relationships involving “cause marketing” and 
“crowdfunding” provide promise for raising both funds and awareness. Both concepts are 
discussed below. 
232 State of Delaware, “147th General Assembly, House Bill #200 (Budget Bill),” June 2013, accessed 
October 17, 2013, http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis147.nsf/vwLegislation/HB+200/$file/legis.pdf?open.  
233 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Public-Private Partnerships,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, accessed October 13, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/public-private-partnerships-1.  
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2. Partnerships 
It would undoubtedly be advantageous for a private sector entity, for example a 
large retailer, to provide a top-of-the-line go-kit to DSP troopers and then market that go-
kit as the one exclusively used by the Delaware State Police to protect their own families. 
This endorsement deal would certainly prove to be mutually beneficial. A good 
illustration of DSP using this type of partnership occurred in the early 1990s. Sig Sauer, a 
then emerging arms manufacturer in the U.S. market, approached DSP with a remarkable 
offer; it would supply the entire division with a service weapon at a deeply discounted 
price in exchange for exclusivity and advertising rights. The company wanted to market 
its new semi-automatic pistol to other law enforcement agencies and to the public as the 
weapon used by DSP.234  This effort also served to position DSP troopers as role models 
within the community through the free advertising in the form of Sig Sauer’s commercial 
marketing endorsement using DSP as its valued consumers.  
3. Cause Marketing 
Along the same lines and on a much wider scale, Duracell partnered with the 
National Volunteer Fire Council in 2012 when it launched a creative marketing campaign 
entitled “Power Those Who Protect Us.”235  This effort highlighted these volunteers and 
noted that many of these everyday heroes used their own funds to purchase batteries to 
power their communication and life-saving equipment. There was an appeal to consumers 
to use an Internet code provided inside the batteries they individually purchased in order 
to direct a battery donation to a specific fire department.236  In the end, and as a result of 
this campaign, Duracell provided 18 million batteries to 11,000 volunteer fire 
departments throughout the U.S. This effort, in essence, created a partnership between 
234 Michael Berry (DSP Lieutenant, Officer-in-Charge of Firearms Training Unit), personal 
communication, August 30, 2012.  
235 Duracell, “The National Volunteer Fire Council and Duracell Launch Battery Donation Program to 
Help Power 23,000 Volunteer Fire Departments across the U.S.,” January 11, 2011, Duracell Newsroom, 




                                                 
Duracell, concerned citizens empathetic to the needs of volunteer firefighters, and the 
firefighters themselves.237 
In July of 2013, Duracell again highlighted firefighters and used them in their 
marketing efforts. The company unveiled Quantum, a new high-quality battery, which 
retails for 20–30 percent more than its normal batteries. These premium batteries were 
marketed as something to be used by these specialists. Duracell pledged to provide one 
million of these batteries to first responders everywhere.238  
In one respect, Duracell sent the message that it backed the community through 
generous contribution and partnership. Underneath it all, it was attempting to increase 
sales by building brand loyalty and consumer confidence through something that has 
been deemed “cause marketing.”239  Companies attempt to raise awareness and money 
for causes through consumer engagement in an environmental or a social issue.240  This 
was not trend setting; however, the company was already a trendsetter. Duracell had 
previously utilized first responders in its marketing efforts. In 2002, a Duracell television 
spot featured the Rocky Mountain Rescue Group and their important job of saving people 
while operating in steep and treacherous terrain. Consumers were left with the message 
that if these high-risk rescue crews trusted Duracell, so should they. There was power in 
this indirect endorsement. The Acme Idea Company served as Duracell’s marketing firm 
for both the 2002 and 2012 campaigns. Scott Kulok, Acme’s creative director, stated that 
the public holds first responders in high regard and noted that “first responders are the 
heroes of our age.”241  He further stated that “when the worst happens, they turn into 
superheroes.”242  
237 Shawn Payne, “Duracell Donates Batteries,” The Citizen-Reporter, April 2012, accessed October 
17, 2013, http://www.sherman-county.com/documents/Reporter42012.pdf.  
238 Andrew Adam Newman, “Duracell Offers Praise, and Power, for Everyday Heroes,” New York 
Times, July 22, 2013, accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/business/media/duracell-offers-praise-and-power-for-everyday-
heroes.html?_r=0. 
239 Henry Frechette, “Defining Cause Branding,” July 21, 2010, Citizen Polity, accessed October 17, 
2013, http://citizenpolity.com/2010/07/21/544/.  
240 Ibid.  
241 Newman, “Duracell Offers Praise.” 
242 Ibid. 
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Duracell’s efforts to support first responders and the community during a crisis 
were not just conveyed through its television advertising campaigns. The company 
actually sprang into action during several recent disasters and provided community 
support through its Power Relief Program. In the immediate wake of several local 
disasters, Duracell “Power Forward Trucks” responded to the affected areas where it 
distributed batteries and set up charging stations.243  Its stated mission was to assist in 
helping citizens “recharge, reconnect, and recover.”244  In addition, its target audience 
was the community, first responders, and responder families.245 This support for the 
cause of its cause marketing campaign is highly commendable and may signal a trend for 
companies to put their money where their markets are. This progressive type of 
collaborative relationship is fertile ground for laying the seeds of responder family 
preparedness. 
4. Crowdfunding 
As opposed to cause marketing that seeks consumer engagement in an issue 
presented to sell a particular product, “crowdfunding” elicits direct contributions to an 
effort, not necessarily a product. Forbes magazine defines this concept as “the practice of 
funding a project or venture by raising many small amounts of money from a large 
number of people, typically via the Internet.”246  Forbes also mentions that crowdfunding 
brings people together and creates communities of “likeminded individuals.”247 
243 Proctor & Gamble, “Procter & Gamble Brings Mobile Relief to Victims of Hurricane Sandy with 




245 “Duracell Power Forward Trucks Bring Mobile Relief to Victims Affected by Alberta Floods,” 
Business Wire, June 26, 2013, accessed August 2, 2013, 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130625006454/en/Media-Advisory-Duracell-Power-Trucks-
Bring-Mobile.  





                                                 
Crowdfunding, as demonstrated by the Vest-A-Dog Foundation, is another 
promising option for responder agencies to raise money. Vest-A-Dog was formed in 1999 
by 11-year old Stephanie Taylor, in Oceanside, California.248  Since that time, 
fundraising and donations to this program have resulted in the issuing of vests to 
thousands of police canines throughout the country. This foundation appealed to the 
public and convinced many that the cause of providing bulletproof vests to police canines 
was worthy of their hard-earned money.   
Responder family preparedness must be marketed to the extent that concerned 
individuals or groups would be willing to make a tax-deductible donation of any size to 
this effort. This cause may strike a chord similar to that of Vest-A-Dog and extend 
beyond the likely contributors such as friends, extended relatives, and civic groups. 
Forbes confirms this trend and advises that crowdfunding, once it achieves momentum, 
brings donors “out of the woodwork.”249  
5. Last Thoughts on Funding 
The bottom line is the bottom line—this effort will cost money. It is important to 
explore ways to obtain funding, to garner support for the cause, and make it happen. As 
seen above, funding is entangled in many other concepts besides money; however, those 
providing the funding in most cases have to believe in the product, project or cause for 
favorable outcome. The traditional funding mechanism of winning the minds and wallets 
of a small number of people, such as lawmakers or wealthy investors, is not necessarily 
the only way to raise money.   
B. ARE RESPONDERS SO DIFFERENT? 
The search and justification for additional funding in this area will inevitably lead 
to some discourse related to the responders being treated differently than average 
citizens. This obstacle is political and politics could negatively affect this effort without 
proper navigation. As Kenneth Kuntz, fire study specialist for the U.S. Fire 
248 Vest-A-Dog Network, “How Vest-a-Dog Began,” 2007, Vest-A-Dog Network, accessed 
September 10, 2013, http://www.vestadog.org/Content/?78.  
249 Prive, “What is Crowdfunding.” 
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Administration, points out that this sort of careful preplanning for responder families 
could backfire.250  He posits that this advanced preparation could be interpreted by the 
public as preferential treatment.251  It is quite possible that citizens may question why 
every trooper’s family is being provided with a go-kit and possibly at the taxpayers’ 
expense while they are not being provided with the same.   
The solution lies in the ability to clearly convey the message that responder 
family preparedness represents a real benefit to society, specifically, to those served by 
the prepared responders. Education of the community and community leaders is crucial to 
avoiding this project experiencing widespread public dissent. With the right public 
information campaigns and lobbying efforts, the message can be carried forward that 
responders and their families are going to be placed in a unique position during a major 
crisis—that of being torn between their families and their duties. The message should 
also communicate that society needs to endorse this preparedness so that first responders 
can immediately spring into action and start helping others. 
Opposition may still come from legislators, citizens, or other organizations. It is 
significant to note that these competing agendas will most likely not represent those 
against responder family preparedness per se, but those who see their cause as a higher 
priority. These opposing forces would most likely represent legitimate agendas 
competing for funding concerning what they deem important.   
A second round of messaging should convey that first responders are truly public 
servants; they benefit the community by putting the community before their own needs or 
concerns. They do not serve in a for-profit organization, which makes them stand apart 
from utility workers and other private industry employees. The go-kit represents a very 
small recompense for the predicament in which responders and their families will 
undoubtedly find themselves should a major crisis occur at home. This is a rational and  
 
250 Anne Louise Bannon, “Too Close to Home: First Responder Families in Danger,” November 15, 




                                                 
highly defendable argument that could be very persuasive with the skills of the right front 
person(s) to carry forth this message. In fact, the U.S. government has already provided 
some precedent for this defense. 
Using the earlier preparedness analogy concerning bulletproof vests, it is 
important to note that the federal government has provided vest funding to elevate the 
overall safety and preparedness of police officers, one category of first responders, to 
protect them from death or serious injury. This effort has been successful, has saved 
numerous lives, and has provided positive cascading effects for the families of these 
responders and the communities that these responders serve. Keeping responders safe and 
on the job is a very positive goal and a cost-worthy proposition.   
If there was any question as to whether the government has specific concern for 
the family of responders, the Public Safety Officers’ Benefit Program (PSOB) serves as 
another solid example. The federal government through the Bureau of Justice Assistance 
has provided a death benefit payment to the family of first responders through the PSOB. 
The benefit for FY-2014 is $333,604.68.252 
In addition, this program provides an educational benefit to the dependents of a 
first responder who dies or becomes totally disabled while on duty. One of the purposes 
of the educational benefit listed in the Public Safety Officers’ Benefit Act of 1976 is “to 
enhance the appeal of service in public safety agencies.”253  This line of thinking by the 
government clearly demonstrates that it already places first responders in a category 
separate from the average citizen. The death benefit and the educational benefit are 
governmental compensation for paying a very high price in the chosen profession of 
public service as a first responder. Both benefits are paid to the family of the responder. 
Any new proposition that costs money is going to be met with some level of 
opposition in today’s financially-strapped world. The idea of responder family 
252 Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program, “Benefits by Year,” Public Safety Officers’ Benefits 
Program, accessed October 17, 2013, https://www.psob.gov/benefits_by_year.html. 
253 Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program, “42 U.S.C. § 3796d Sec. 1211 Purposes,” Public Safety 
Officers’ Benefits Program, accessed June 25, 2013, 
https://www.psob.gov/files/PSOBRegs2013.htm#StatEdPurposes.  
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preparedness is not an impossible sell, perhaps not even extremely difficult. As evidenced 
by the above example of PSOB, legislators are empathetic, perhaps even sympathetic, to 
the sacrifices that first responders and their families make. With the right lobbying 
efforts, this agenda and the related paradigm shift could be contagious. 
C. CHANGING THE MINDSET 
1. The Impact and Potential Impacts 
This effort, will no doubt, have a positive effect and will make a difference in the 
lives of DSP troopers and their families. They will be prepared to the basic level 
recommended by the U.S. government. FEMA has been attempting to get all citizens to 
attain this minimal level of preparedness for over a decade and has had very limited 
success. The citizens served by DSP will also benefit since there are demonstrated 
potential negative rippling effects for communities if their responders are among the 
unprepared. The public has placed a very large amount of trust in their first responders, 
and they will have the knowledge that their responders are prepared to better assist them 
in the worst of times. 
This identified policy gap has a very strong potential of drawing the attention of 
local, state, and federal government officials since it is directly related to the 
preparedness of our country. Though responder family preparedness starts first at the 
individual level, then at the agency level, it fits into a much larger picture of our nation 
being adequately prepared. Similarly, all incidents relating to homeland security in this 
country, whether natural or manmade, start at the local level. All levels of government 
have a stake in this issue since a lack of preparedness represents a liability to our 
collective homeland security. 
2. Risks and Payoffs  
There are risks in the sense that the government’s estimate of 72 hours may prove 
insufficient and that this minimal preparedness will not be enough for families to survive 
on their own during a major disaster. It is impossible to plan for every scenario; however, 
this level of minimal preparedness is the one prescribed by the U.S. government since 
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shortly after 9/11. It is also the same level that the government, lacking significant 
success, has been attempting to have all citizens achieve on their own. It would truly be a 
payoff to have responder families measurably and verifiably at this level, so that there 
would be some level of assurance that responders could more rapidly get started helping 
others during a large crisis and perform their skills at a higher level. 
Another risk could involve the vulnerability to the behaviors that develop when 
certain incentives are taken away. There is a risk in providing go-kits to these families 
since they could lose the incentive to prepare themselves.254  If first-responder families 
do not truly embrace preparedness and change their mindset, they could lose their drive 
to be self-sufficient and instead continuously rely on DSP. The payoff lies in the fact that 
DSP families will very quickly have what they need to be prepared, but this does involve 
risk down the road. Planning will need to address this potential pitfall. Continuous 
engagement and reengagement of responder families will greatly assist in negating this 
effect. Future monitoring and evaluation in this area is essential.  
It is important to add that this minimal preparation is only the first step in 
developing a culture of preparedness and further engaging responder families to embrace 
preparedness and a higher level of self-reliance. Both are important components of 
building resilience through a sense of control and an attitude of self-efficacy. It is also 
important to add that minimal preparedness is the first step in moving toward higher 
levels of preparedness. As such, another payoff is delivered since this creates the 
immediate ability for responder agencies to then move to higher levels of family 
preparedness. 
3. Collaboration 
The Delaware State Police is but one organization within a much larger first-
responder community, which is comprised of local, state, and national levels. As noted 
earlier, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) identifies first 
responders as “those individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for 
254 Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel, “When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to 
Modify Behavior,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 4 (2011): 191–210, 
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.25.4.191.  
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the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, 
including emergency response providers…”255 It also includes “emergency management, 
public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as 
equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during prevention, 
response, and recovery operations.”256 These are the individuals from organizations that 
will dedicate everything, including possibly their lives, as well as the safety, wellbeing, 
and also potentially the lives of their families for the greater good of those they serve. 
This is a category of public servant like no other, ergo the separate presidential 
distinction as a first responder. Though they come from various responder organizations, 
be it at the local, state, tribal, or federal level, there is strength in their overall numbers. 
Collaboration between separate disciplines within the first-responder community is key to 
building a unified effort.  
This collaborative effort within the first-responder community could serve as the 
impetus in our country to make responder family preparedness the new norm. Individual 
responder agencies, such as the Delaware State Police, can blaze the trail forward in 
attempting to provide a smart practice for others to follow. Individual action in this 
collaborative effort is not a bad thing; it could provide the testing ground to learn what 
works, what does not work, and provide some insight on how to afford and streamline the 
process. The overall goal of this collaboration is to create the understanding that the 
responder community is willing to give up everything for those they serve and that 
responders need some assurance that their families will be prepared. A unified voice 
would prove valuable toward changing the national mindset and establishing this need. 
Recognizing that the first-responder community is broad and the fact that this 
preparedness may never be tested, it is best to initiate this endeavor using those who enter 
harm’s way each and every day. The combined effort of the police, fire, and emergency 
medical service serves as a great functional starting point. These three distinct disciplines 
have different specialties, yet they are intertwined in their daily responsibilities within 
their shared and overlapping communities. Similarly, they will most definitely be 
255 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8. 
256 Ibid. 
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involved at the onset of a disaster or major incident in their jurisdiction or possibly 
















The idea for this project began with the suspicion that there exists a widespread 
policy gap in the first-responder realm concerning family preparedness. Though the 
responder community proudly holds its families in high regard, a disconnection is 
potentially created when responders are called for duty during a large-scale crisis. As 
such, responders must leave their families while likely feeling concerned that their loved 
ones may need them or become endangered in their absence. In essence, when responders 
are needed out in their communities, they are also needed at home.   
Research sought out agencies that were providing, requiring, or documenting 
policy in this area. Though responder family preparedness may be occurring on a very 
limited basis, nothing was prevalent in the literature or other media to indicate 
widespread or well-known activity. Literature did demonstrate that U.S. government 
efforts at attempting to get citizens minimally prepared, particularly since the eye-
opening events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, have yielded lackluster results. It also 
revealed that responders and their families have generally been lumped in with the rest of 
the citizenry, despite their unique position during these desperate times.   
The overall lack of existing policy provides evidence to confirm the existence of 
this suspected gap. The U.S. government has made a separate distinction for first 
responders through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) and for their 
families through the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program. These designations 
highlight the fact that responders are, indeed, in a category apart from the citizens they 
serve. Furthermore, the federal government has contended, through the Ready Responder 
program, that communities and businesses cannot be prepared without first ensuring the 
safety of the responders and their families.257 In light of this, responder family 
preparedness needs to be treated as a priority. 
The Delaware State Police, like most responder agencies, lacks planning in this 
area. Therefore, this research focused on the primary question as to whether the 
257 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Ready Responder Toolkit, 1. 
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development and execution of a comprehensive family preparedness program would be 
advisable to assist the agency in maintaining its capabilities during a disaster. Since 
nothing comprehensive was discovered in existing policy, bits and pieces of interesting 
and valuable ideas found in the literature helped to shape a potential path toward the 
creation of policy for DSP.  
Of the interesting ideas in circulation, the go-kit was determined to be a very 
important component of family preparedness. It is very hard to argue against this low-
cost, minimal preparedness measure when the U.S. government has been telling the 
citizenry continuously for over a decade that they could be without responder assistance 
for at least three days. Another government recommendation, the Ready Responder 
program, was also deemed to hold significant value in planning and policy creation due 
to its adaptable framework. Kelenske pointed out that Ready Responder could be the path 
toward nationwide standardization of responder preparedness.258 Further enhancing 
efforts to support families, Kindt proposed developing a family support network and 
encouraged the government to capitalize on the success of the military in this area.259  
Demme also suggested that responder agencies develop family support units and she 
provided cost-effective solutions for implementation through the use of in-house 
resources.260  Fortunately, FEMA came to the recent realization that attempting to sell 
everyone on preparedness was not a viable solution. As such, major consideration was 
given to focusing the preparedness outreach on those who would most likely listen and be 
most inclined to assist others. First responders and their families fit best in this category. 
One missing ingredient in comprehensive responder family preparedness planning 
is a synthesis of the good ideas like those proposed by the government, Kelenske, Kindt, 
and Demme. These ideas and recommendations provide a path forward; however, this 
path is pointless unless someone is willing to take the first steps. A mandate of family 
preparedness with responder organizations taking responsibility for and ownership of this 
movement is the final and necessary ingredient.   
258 Kelenske, “Emergency Responder,” 79. 
259 Kindt, Building Population, 15. 
260 Demme, “Government Expectations,” 61. 
 74 
                                                 
It is significant to note that this exploration dealt only with minimal preparedness 
measures for DSP. Future research and planning efforts should attempt to move beyond 
simply minimal measures and focus on improving and expanding overall responder 
family preparedness. Evacuation and sheltering plans for families and their pets, 
advanced networking and arrangements with neighboring jurisdictions and collaboration 
with the military all provide possible further avenues for valuable research on this topic. 
Future planning should also include civilian personnel within the responder agencies. 
Though not always deemed “essential” in a crisis, their everyday contributions to the 
organization should not be overlooked.  
In closing, it is recommended that DSP commit to the preparedness of its troopers 
and their families by instituting this three-part strategy to ensure that they have 
formulated and verified plans, that they possess the specified items that DSP has required 
for initial post-disaster survival, and that an internal support system is in place. The 
division should not leave any doubt as to whether or not troopers and their families are 
prepared for these most dire circumstances, especially when the division is requiring that 
the family divide for the benefit of all citizens. This mandate of service calls for both 
insurance and assurance that the trooper and his/her family are adequately prepared. The 
division bears the responsibility of providing mental and material support during this 
created DSP family crisis brought on by the larger community crisis.  
This new way of thinking and acceptance of responsibility for our protectors and 
their families creates a new paradigm in the world of responder preparedness. DSP would 
be among the first-responder agencies, if not the first, to create and mandate a 
comprehensive responder family preparedness policy for the protection of its own. In 
addition, it would also signal the start of a larger movement to take responder family 
preparedness out of the “optional” category and to have it viewed as a necessity. This will 
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